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The Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary was first 
published in 1975.  The new association between 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the University of Strathclyde’s 
Business School provides the Fraser of Allander Institute 
with the support to continue the Commentary, and we 
gratefully acknowledge this support.  The Fraser of Allander 
Institute is a research unit within the Department of 
Economics at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow.  The 
Institute carries out research on the Scottish economy, 
including the analysis of short-term movements in economic 
activity.  Its researchers have an international reputation in 
modelling regional economies and in regional development.  
One-off research projects can be commissioned by private 
and public sector clients.  If you would like further 
information on the Institute’s research or services, please 
contact the Institute Administrator on 0141 548 3958 or 
email the Institute at fraser@strath.ac.uk. 
 
The Fraser of Allander Institute was established in 1975 as 
a result of a donation from the Hugh Fraser Foundation.  We 
gratefully acknowledge the contribution of the Buchanan 
and Ewing Bequest towards the publication costs of the 
Commentary.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PwC support the production of the Economic Commentary but have 
no control of its editorial content, including, in particular, the 
economic forecasts.  PwC produces its own regular review of UK 
and international economic prospects, the next issue of which will 
be published on their website:  
http://www.pwc.co.uk/eng/publications/uk_economic_outlook.html 
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Outlook 
and  
appraisal 
Overview 
 
 
 
The recovery continues to be weak in both 
Scotland and the UK. Our view of the 
performance of the economy has been distorted 
by the effects of the bad weather on production in 
December last year. However, once an 
allowance is made for weather effects it still looks 
as if GDP growth was stagnant over the last 6 
months to the first quarter 2011. There are mixed 
messages on whether stagnation is continuing or 
whether the recovery has resumed again. It 
seems likely that the economy is still continuing 
to recover but at a fairly weak rate. Almost three 
years after the start of the recession the Scottish 
economy has only recovered about a quarter of 
the output lost, while the UK economy has 
recovered a third of lost output. These data 
support the evidence-based view that recovery 
from financially sourced recessions, particularly 
banking crises, are slow and painful. Exports are 
recovering slowly and business investment is 
fairly static with firms sitting on large piles of cash 
but unwilling to invest due to the uncertainty. So, 
the evidence seems to be moving in favour of 
those advocating a "Plan B"  for the UK 
authorities to take some action to stimulate 
demand, it needs to be understood that while 
buttressing demand might be a necessary 
condition for a more rapid recovery it is not 
sufficient. We must be sure that our banking 
system is fit for purpose, able to freely lend to 
support the needs of the economy. It is not clear 
that we have presently reached that point. It is to 
be hoped that the final recommendations of the 
Independent Commission on Banking meet this 
requirement and that the proposals are adopted 
by the government. 
 
Significant uncertainties cloud the prospects for 
future growth: 
 
x contagion in the eurozone debt crisis as 
the fears of default on sovereign debt 
spreads from Greece to Spain and 
perhaps other peripheral eurozone 
countries, risks damaging bank lending, 
market and business confidence; 
 
x fears of a slowdown in the growth of the 
Chinese economy as consumer price 
inflation takes hold; 
PAGE 4 VOLUME 35  NUMBER 1 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY                          
JUNE 2011 PAGE 5 
x continuing uncertainty on the effects of 
the "Arab spring" with implications for oil 
prices and trade; 
 
x the continuing weakness of the US 
economy and its effect on world trade; 
 
x household expenditure is likely to 
continue to remain weak due to the 
continuing fiscal consolidation and the 
squeeze on real disposable incomes from 
the current high level of energy prices; 
 
x consumer price inflation is above target 
and is likely to remain so for some time, 
household disposable incomes are being 
squeezed as a result. All of which runs 
the risk of a rise in inflationary 
expectations and strengthened wage 
claims, but there is little sign that this is 
happening with the demand for labour still 
relatively weak and earnings growth 
remaining at around 2% p.a. 
 
Against this background we are forecasting that 
growth of GDP will be somewhat weaker in 2011 
at 0.8%, than our forecast of 1% growth in 
March. Our forecasts remain below the OBR and 
consensus forecasts for the UK in 2011, 2012 
and 2013, which largely reflects the weaker 
growth of household spending in Scotland and a 
sluggish outlook for private sector investment. 
Next  year, we are forecasting  growth of 1.5%, 
0.1% points less than our March forecast, and an 
unchanged forecast of 1.9% for 2013.  We 
expect that production and manufacturing output 
will continue to pick up reasonably strongly, but 
at a slightly lesser rate than in our previous 
forecast with production growing at 3.6% in 2012 
compared to 4% in our March forecast. The 
service sector is forecast to continue on its weak 
growth path growing by 0.5% this year, 1.1% in 
2012 and 1.3% in 2013, largely due to the 
weakness in the growth of household 
expenditure. Construction also continues to 
exhibit weak growth of 0.5% in 2011, 0.9% in 
2012, and 1.1% in 2013, reflecting cut-backs in 
government capital spending and weak private 
sector investment. 
 
We continue to expect net employment growth 
during this year and over the forecast horizon. 
Net jobs grow by 0.9% in 2011, 0.8% in 2012 and 
1.7% in 2010. By 2013 total employee jobs are 
forecast to be 2,373,000, around 60,000 fewer 
than in 2007 but up by 80,000 from the end of 
2010. By sector, the largest percentage growth in 
job numbers is forecast for the production 
sectors, but the greatest number of jobs created 
will still be in services, despite the low forecast 
for output growth, due to the sheer scale of the 
sector. 
 
Even though growth in output picks up it will not 
be sufficient to prevent some pickup in 
unemployment. Unemployment in Scotland this 
year is therefore forecast to rise to 8.3%, or 
217,000 by the end of the year and be largely 
stable through 2012 with a slight further rise to 
220,000 by the year end. After that, the rate 
should fall to 8.2% by end 2013. However, as 
previous quarters have demonstrated there is 
considerable uncertainty around the 
unemployment forecast. 
 
We also revisit the issue of the longer-term 
performance of the Scottish economy. We note 
the recent evidence of the rise in Scottish GDP 
per head relative to the UK during most of the 
last decade, which comes from UK Regional 
Accounts data published in December. Further 
analysis leads us to conclude that the evidence 
of an appreciably higher Scottish GDP per head 
relative to the UK by the end of the first decade 
of the new millennium is the result of both the 
differential effects of large cyclical movements 
and slower population growth on the relative. It 
does not appear to be explained by an 
improvement in Scotland's relative 
competitiveness, or underlying economic 
performance. 
 
 
Recent GDP performance 
The Scottish Government GDP data for the fourth quarter 
2010 - released on 20th April - indicate that the Scottish 
economy suffered a marked decline in output, although a 
little less severe than the UK as a whole. Scottish GDP 
contracted by -0.4% while UK GDP fell, on revised figures, 
by -0.5% - see Figure 1. 
 
The Office of National Statistics (ONS) estimate that -0.5% 
points of the UK GDP reduction was due to the unusually 
bad weather conditions in December in Britain, implying that 
growth in the British economy had stagnated after the strong 
recovery of the second and third quarters. As Figure 1 
reveals, much the same can be said for the Scottish 
economy. Over the year to the fourth quarter, the Scottish 
economy grew by 0.8% compared to 1.4% in the UK, 
indicating a weaker recovery from recession here. 
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Figure 1:  Scottish and UK quarterly GDP growth, 1998q2 to 2010q4 
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The comparative overall GDP performance of Scotland and 
the UK over the recession and subsequent recovery to 
2010q4 is given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Scottish and UK GDP: recession and recovery 
 
     Scotland UK 
GDP fall in recession -5.62% -6.31% 
Change from  peak to 2010 
Q4 
-4.28% -4.34% 
GDP recovery to 2010 Q4   1.42%   2.11% 
 
 
Table 1 shows that the recovery is clearly weak in both 
Scotland and the UK with both economies more than 4% 
below the previous peak before recession started in 2008q2 
in Scotland and 2008q1 in the UK. So, almost three years 
after the start of the recession the Scottish economy has 
only recovered about a quarter of the output lost in 
recession, while the UK economy has recovered a third of 
lost output. These data support the evidence-based view 
that recovery from financially sourced recessions, 
particularly banking crises, are slow and painful1.  Indeed, 
Reinhart and  Rogoff (2009) make the point that after severe 
banking crises "countries in crisis that fail to fix their financial 
systems - such as Japan in the 1990s - can find themselves 
going in and out of recession and performing below potential 
capacity for years. The evidence seems to be moving in 
favour of those advocating a "Plan B"  for the UK authorities 
to take some action to stimulate demand, it needs to be 
understood that while buttressing demand might be a 
necessary condition for a more rapid recovery it is not 
sufficient. We must be sure that our banking system is fit for 
purpose, able to freely lend to support the needs of the 
economy. It is not clear that we have presently reached that 
point. It is to be hoped that the final recommendations of the 
Independent Commission on Banking meet this requirement 
and that the proposals are adopted by the government. 
 
In the 4th quarter of 2010, the service sector in Scotland – 
accounting for 74% of overall GVA on 2007 weights – 
suffered a fall in GVA of -0.1% while output in UK services 
fell much more by -0.6% - see Figure 2. Over the year to 
2010q4, GVA in Scottish services fell by -0.1% compared to 
a rise of 1.1% in the UK. The comparative overall GVA 
performance of Scottish and UK services over the recession 
and subsequent recovery is given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Scottish and UK Services GVA: recession and 
recovery 
 
    Scotland UK 
GVA fall in recession -4.39% -4.48% 
Change from  peak to 2010 Q4 -4.17% -.2.99% 
GVA recovery to 2010 Q4  0.23%   1.55% 
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Figure 2:  Scottish and UK services GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2010q4 
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It is clear from Table 2 that while the loss of output in the 
recession in Scottish services was similar to UK services, 
the sector had hardly started to recover in Scotland nearly 3 
years later with just 5% of output lost recovered by 2010q4. 
In the UK, in contrast, the service sector, while still 
recovering weakly had nonetheless recovered 35% of lost 
output by 2010q4. 
 
Within services, the almost flat performance in the 4th 
quarter was associated with considerable variation in the 
performance of the seven  principal sectors that comprise 
the sector. On the positive side, 3 sectors exhibited positive 
growth during the quarter, with retail & wholesale growing by 
0.5% in the quarter and by 1.8% over the year. The 
comparable UK retail & wholesale figures were growth of 
0.2% and 2.9%, perhaps one indication that Scottish 
household spending has been more subdued than its UK 
counterpart over the year. Real estate and business 
services (REBS) grew by 0.4% in the quarter and by 0.5% 
over the year, a stronger performance than its UK 
counterpart in the 4th quarter, which contracted by -0.7% 
but grew more strongly by 2.7% over the year. Public admin, 
education and health also exhibited some growth in the 4th 
quarter with GVA rising by 0.2% and 0.3% over the year. 
The UK public sector grew similarly in the 4th quarter but 
with 1% growth over the year continued to expand by more 
than its Scottish counterpart. Presumably, now that fiscal 
consolidation has begun in earnest we should expect to see 
some negative outcomes in the measured growth of the 
public sector. On the negative side, other services 
contracted by -1.5% in Scotland in the quarter and by -3.9% 
over the year. This was a much bigger contraction in both 
time periods than other services in the UK which contracted 
by -1.2% in the fourth quarter but grew by 2.1% over the 
year. Hotels & catering, transport, storage & communication 
and financial services all contracted in the fourth quarter in 
Scotland by -0.3%, -0.8%, and -1.4%, respectively. This was 
somewhat better than their UK counterparts in Hotels & 
catering and Transport which contracted by -2.1%, -1.7% in 
the UK. Financial services in contrast contracted by -1.1% in 
the UK compared to -1.4% in Scotland - see Figure 3. 
 
Table 3:  Scottish and UK manufacturing GVA 
recession and recovery 
 
 
    Scotland UK 
GVA fall in recession -10.63% -14.51% 
Change from  peak to 2010 Q4 - 8.17% - 9.36% 
GVA recovery to 2010 Q4   2.75%    .03% 
 
 
 
 
It is evident from Figure 3 that Financial services continues 
in recession in the UK and with three successive quarters of 
negative growth has moved back into recession in Scotland. 
Hotels & catering can also be considered to be in recession 
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Figure 3:  Scottish and UK financial services GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2010q4 
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Figure 4:  Scottish and UK manufacturing GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2010q4 
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The manufacturing sector in Scotland contracted by -0.6% 
in the fourth quarter while UK manufacturing grew by 1.1% - 
see Figure 4. Over the year, the sector grew by 1% in 
Scotland compared to 3.6% in the UK, again suggesting a 
weaker recovery here than in the UK. Table 3 reveals the 
extent of the recovery in manufacturing in Scotland 
compared to the UK. The recession in UK manufacturing 
was much greater than in Scotland. To the fourth quarter UK 
manufacturing had recovered 42% of the output lost while  
Scottish manufacturing had only recovered 26% of the 
production lost in recession. 
 
Within manufacturing, some key sectors did enjoy positive 
growth in the fourth quarter despite the overall fall of -0.6% 
in Scottish manufacturing GVA. Engineering grew by 1.4% 
in the quarter and by 1.3% over the year. But within 
engineering the electronics sector contracted by -1.4% in 
the quarter and by -4.1% over the year. In contrast, 
transport equipment grew by 7.1% in the quarter and by 
10.1% over the year, while mechanical engineering grew by 
0.4% in the quarter and by 2% over the year. Outside 
engineering textiles, footwear and clothing grew by 2.5% in 
the quarter and by 7.9% over the year. The food & tobacco 
sector also grew by 0.3% and by 4% over the year. On the 
negative side, significant fourth quarter contractions were 
evident in  refined petrol products & nuclear fuel where GVA 
fell by -9.1% in the quarter and by -3.7% over the year. 
Fortunately, the sector only accounts for 0.3% of overall 
GVA. In paper, printing and publishing GVA fell by -5.6% in 
the quarter but rose by 2.6% over the year. It is worth noting 
that, in the  fourth quarter in manufacturing chemicals and 
electronics slipped back into recession displaying two 
quarters of negative growth, while refined petrol products & 
nuclear fuel has been in recession for 4 consecutive 
quarters. 
 
Figure 5:  Scottish and UK construction GVA volume growth 1998q2-2010q4 
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Finally, in this survey of the performance of the key 
productive sectors in Scotland we note  that the construction 
sector weakened considerably in the fourth quarter as the 
effects of the poor weather caused work on activity to cease 
or be postponed. The sector contracted by -2% in the 
quarter compared to a similar contraction of -2.3% in the UK 
- see Figure 5. Over the year, Scottish construction 
performed more strongly than its UK counterpart growing by 
11.2% compared to 6%. 
 
Table 4 indicates that Scottish construction has tended to 
outperform its UK counterpart during both recession and 
recovery. Indeed, it continues to be the only principal sector 
in Scotland that has recovered the output lost in recession 
having recovered 122% of the GVA lost, whereas by the 
fourth quarter UK construction had only recovered 64% of 
the GVA lost in the recession, although this is still better 
than the performance of most other sectors. 
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Table 4:  Scottish and UK construction GVA:  recession 
and recovery 
 
   Scotland UK 
GVA fall in recession -13.71% -14.08% 
Change from  peak to 2010 Q4     0.78%   -6.31% 
GVA recovery to 2010 Q4  16.79%    9.05% 
 
 
What is clear from this survey of industrial performance in 
Scotland is that the evidence points to a slowing of the 
recovery by the fourth quarter which looks to be more than 
simply weather related. Figure 6 presents the GVA 
performance of key Scottish growth sectors which we 
usually examine each quarter. What is clear from the figure 
is that growth in many sectors is weakening. Indeed, 
excluding the public sector 4 of the 10 private sectors were 
in recession by the fourth quarter for 3 successive quarters: 
financial services and hotels & catering, or for two 
successive quarters: electronics and chemicals. Given the 
need for the economy to export and invest its way to 
recovery the fact that two key manufacturing sectors have 
slipped back into recession is worrying. 
 
The overall aggregate position in the economy during 
recession and recovery is presented in Figure 7. This figure 
contains the latest employment data for the UK and 
Scotland up to the first quarter of 2011. Overall, as noted 
above, the Scottish economy had by the fourth quarter of 
last year recovered only about a quarter of the GVA lost in 
recession compared with a third for the UK. This is not a 
dramatic difference as the graph of Scottish and UK GVA in 
Figure 7 shows. However, it does hide the fact that the 
strength of the recovery of Scottish output has been largely 
driven by construction and to a lesser extent manufacturing. 
With 5% output recovered the service sector has hardly 
shown any recovery at all. Moreover, even when allowing 
 
Figure 6:  Growth of key sectors in Scotland 1998q2 to 2010q4 
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for the weather in the fourth quarter of last year the recovery 
appears to be weakening and this looks as if it has 
continued into 2011. This especially appears to be the case 
with job creation, which as Figure 7 indicates went into 
reverse in Scotland between the final quarter of 2010 and 
the first quarter of this year. It is true that there has been 
stronger job creation in Scotland in recent quarters than in 
the UK , but as we argued in previous Commentaries, the 
stronger Scottish jobs growth has probably been a reflection 
of the large shake-out of jobs that occurred between the 
final quarter of 2009 and the first quarter of 2010. The 
Scottish unemployment rate - ILO - measure - has fallen 
again by 10,000 in February to April compared with the 
previous three months to 7.7%, which places the rate on  a  
par with the UK, where the unemployment rate also fell, 
even though employment in Scotland dropped by 7,000. But 
by the first quarter of this year total employment was still 
nearly 3% below the last peak before recession, whereas  
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Figure 7:  GVA and jobs in recession and recovery:  Scotland and UK 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  Scottish real GDP growth 199-2009 using regional accounts and volume measure – percent per annum 
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UK employment was only 1% below its pre-recession peak. 
That is a mark both of the greater job loss in the recession 
and the weaker recovery in Scotland; there can be no 
complacency about the state of the jobs market in Scotland. 
 
Scottish Growth and GDP per head 
In the March Commentary we analysed Scotland's growth 
performance over the last 50 years and came to the 
following conclusions: 
 
x Scottish growth over almost 50 years is 
comparable to UK growth – a little lower in 
absolute terms – but middling by international 
standards. Trend growth in GDP per head is 
slightly higher in Scotland but largely due to 
weaker population growth; 
 
x Mature economies tend to display similar trend 
growth close to 2%. Although, small open 
economies have scope for faster growth and 
decline due to significance of resource mobility e.g. 
capital and labour, into and out of the economy; 
 
x Until the recent recession, the most important 
sectors for Scottish growth were real estate & 
business services, financial services, retailing & 
wholesaling, and transport & communication, much 
the same as in the UK; 
 
x Ranking fifth in importance the public sector was 
much less important to growth than has often been 
suggested and no more important in Scotland than 
in the UK; 
 
x The analysis suggested that if Scotland could 
move closer to the UK industrial structure it would 
get a growth dividend, because Scotland is 
somewhat less specialised in fast growing sectors 
such as business services & real estate, retail & 
wholesale and transport & communication; 
  
x But the analysis also suggested that the 
performance of Scottish industry has been 
generally weaker than UK industrial counterparts 
and that suggests an intrinsic competitiveness 
problem; 
 
x This is supported by evidence that Scottish labour 
productivity growth is weaker than UK. But unit 
labour costs are, on average, about 3% lower here, 
which suggests that we have a problem of lower 
total factor productivity: it is not simply low 
investment and low capital per worker that is the 
problem; 
 
x Scotland's export base is narrowly focused, is 
declining, and may have been eroded further in the 
recession; 
x To raise Scotland's growth rate we argued that 
there was a need to grow the export base by 
developing companies of scale and attracting 
inward investment, and enhancing its 
competitiveness through innovation, R&D and 
improved business sophistication, including 
promoting leadership and enterprise; 
 
x Scotland's strong university research base, 
technological and sectoral know-how, graduate 
supply, high social capital and amenity, are 
strengths that offer a basis for future growth in key 
sectors; 
 
x Small firms have a low export propensity but policy 
can raise economy-wide value added both by 
seeking raise the exports of SMEs and by 
encouraging new and small firms to seek to link 
into the supply-chains of the key 400 firms in the 
Scottish export base. 
 
Following on from this analysis our colleagues in the Centre 
for Public Policy for Regions (CPPR) published 
independently an analysis of Scotland's relative economic 
performance since devolution compared to the UK and 
Wales and Northern Ireland. Using data from the Regional 
Accounts database CPPR analysed  Scottish GDP per head 
relative to the UK over the period of devolution. They note ".. 
the growth rate on this measure has been above that of the 
UK every year since 2004 (and, since 2001, it has been 
faster than the UK in every year bar one, 2004). This 
apparent out-performance of the UK economy, both in good 
times as well as bad, is little commented upon by 
government(s) or academia2. 
 
We welcome the opportunity both to comment on the 
performance of Scotland's GDP per head relative and to 
take the analysis further. 
 
CPPR correctly note that using the UK Regional Accounts 
data, which estimates GVA at current basic prices by 
utilising data on incomes, Scotland's GDP per head relative 
to the UK has risen for most of the period between 2001 and 
2009 - excepting 2004. So, in 2000, the first full year of 
devolution, the relative stood at 94 - i.e. average produced 
income amounted to 94% of the UK average. By 2009 this 
had risen to 99, or almost par with the UK. For the relative to 
rise it is correct to argue that GDP per head had risen faster 
than in the UK but the conclusion that the Scottish economy 
outperformed the UK during this period needs to be heavily 
qualified, for several reasons. 
 
First, the UK Regional Accounts data give a quite different 
estimate of Scottish GDP growth over the period from the 
GVA at basic prices volume data produced by the Scottish 
government, and which is normally used to provide a picture 
of the growth of the Scottish economy. Figure 8 graphs the 
two series. It is evident that they are quite a bit different. The 
Regional Accounts Series is based on a weighted five year 
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moving average and so is a "smoothed" series whereas the 
volume measure employs no smoothing. In addition, the 
income based approach might be less robust than a 
production based approach as used by the Scottish 
government in their series, this is because of the difficulty of 
tracking incomes but also because comparison with the UK 
implies that a UK price deflator is used to deflate Scottish 
incomes. While a Scottish price deflator could be similar to 
the UK series it need not be the same. Yet, there is some 
merit in using a smoothing technique but it might not be the 
best way to remove the impact of short-term shocks to GDP 
such as a recession. So, we see that the smoothing has 
worked in Scotland's favour by producing a contraction at 
2009 UK prices of GDP in 2009 of -2.36% but a much 
greater contraction of -3.68% in the UK (less extra-regio) 
series. The Scottish volume series shows that the Scottish 
economy contracted by less in the recession overall by -
5.62% compared to -6.31% in the UK. The difference was 
not as marked as implied by the Regional Account series. 
The fact that Scotland did better in the recession relative to 
the UK says little or nothing about Scotland's long-run 
growth performance. Ideally, the series should be adjusted 
by a long-term growth trend rather than a moving average. 
We do this below. 
 
 
Figure 9:  Scottish and UK annual population growth 2000-2009 
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In order to deal with these issues we have recomputed the 
Scottish GDP per head relative to the UK using first the 
Scottish government's GVA series, we have also applied 
both Scottish and UK population growth rates to the two 
series to standardise for the differential movements in 
population on the GDP per head relative. The results are 
presented in Figure 10. 
Secondly, while economists stress the importance of GDP 
per head as a measure of welfare and prosperity one needs 
to be careful about drawing conclusions on relative 
economic performance, in terms of say productive 
efficiency, from such series. This is because the series is 
affected by population movements and differences between 
the two jurisdictions can distort the GDP per head relative. 
Figure 9 indicates that during the devolution period Scottish 
population growth was consistently less than UK population 
growth, was negative in two of the years 2000 and 2002 but 
improved over the period to parity with the UK in 2009. The 
effect of weaker Scottish population growth is to boost GDP 
per head growth relative to the UK. 
 
Figure 10 shows first the GDP per head relative using the 
Regional Accounts series with Scottish population as used 
by CPPR. The second series replaces Scottish population 
growth with UK population growth and the Scottish relative 
falls and is on average 1.7 percentage points lower over the 
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Figure 10:  Scottish GDP per head, 1999 to 2009, with alternative GVA growth estimates and Scottish and UK 
population growth, (UK=100) 
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Figure 11:  GDP per head in Scotland (UK=100) 1999 to 2009 applying historic trend growth to 1999 GDP per head for 
Scotland and UK, and dividing by actual population for Scotland and UK in these years  
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period from 2000-2009 averaging 93.7 against 95.4 before. 
The third series takes the Scottish government's GVA series 
and Scottish population growth to compute the relative. 
Here the average is 94.5, 0.8 percentage points below the 
Regional Accounts series. Finally, we apply UK population 
growth to the Scottish governments GVA data to get the 
final series, which has an average of 92.8 or 2.6 percentage 
points below the original Regional Accounts series. It is 
worth noting that it is only when the Regional Accounts 
series is used that there is any rise in the Scottish GDP per 
head relative between 1999 and 2009, when we standardise 
for population growth the series rises slightly from 94.5 to 
96.3. However, when we use the Scottish government 
volume GVA series the relative is largely unchanged 
between 1999 and 2009 going from 94.5 to 94.6. However, 
when we standardise for population the relative falls over 
the period from 94.5 to 92.2. On this basis, it does not seem 
appropriate to characterise the Scottish economy as 
outperforming the UK economy between 1999 and 2009. 
The last decade was, of course, a period of marked short-
term cyclical movements with a boom occurring in the 
middle part of the decade followed by a recession the scale 
of which was greater than anything we have experienced 
since the Great Depression of the early 1930s. It is a 
stylised fact that Scotland has a flatter business cycle than 
the UK, suffering less in recessions and recovering less 
strongly. These movements can therefore mask longer-term 
performance trends and their effect on the GDP per head 
relative. In Figure 11 we apply different GDP trends based 
on the (geometric) average Scottish and UK growth 
experience over different time periods prior to the severe 
recession of 2008 and 2009. 
 
The first point to note is that the GDP per head relative 
changes little over the ten years. It rises slightly if Scottish 
trend growth is the 1963 to 2007 and the 1990 to 2007 
trend. In the former, Scottish GDP averaged 2.24% p.a. 
against a UK average of 2.40%. In the 1990 to 2007 period 
growth averaged 2.38% p.a. in Scotland and 2.58% p.a. in 
the UK . For the other three trends the relative either 
remains the same or falls over the period. 
 
So, we can conclude that the evidence of an appreciably 
higher Scottish GDP per head relative to the UK by the end 
of the first decade of the new millennium is the result of both 
the differential effects of large cyclical movements and 
slower population growth on the relative. It does not appear 
to be explained by an improvement in Scotland's relative 
competitiveness, or underlying economic performance. 
 
Forecasts 
 
Background 
Both the Scottish and UK economies had clearly weakened 
by the end of last year and this was due to more than just 
the effect of bad weather.  The surge in job creation, which 
followed the shakeout of jobs at the beginning of 2010 
appeared to have come to an end by the beginning of 2011 
as job creation in Scotland fell in the first quarter even 
though unemployment continued to fall (See Labour Market 
section in this Commentary below). In the first quarter of 
2011, UK GDP rose by 0.5% but there is general agreement 
that this largely reflected a catch-up of activity postponed in 
the bad weather of the final quarter of 2010. UK growth had 
effectively been stagnant for 6 months. First, quarter 
GDP/GVA data for Scotland are not available until the third 
week of July. In the absence of outturn data we must rely on 
the business surveys for information on the performance of 
the Scottish economy in recent months. 
 
Scottish business surveys (see Business Surveys section in 
this Commentary below) generally suggest a continuing 
weakness in the demand for their goods and services 
against a background of increasing cost pressures, with 
rising raw material and energy costs of particular concern. 
Consumer confidence and domestic demand remains weak 
with export markets key for manufacturers. Despite this the 
latest Lloyds TSB Scotland Business Monitor, for the three 
months to the end of May, reports that the economy is 
continuing to recover with a third of firms reporting 
increased turnover, and expectations of improving trade 
over the next six months at their highest level for more than 
three years. But the survey concludes  that "the economy 
remains fragile as consumer spending is constrained by low 
confidence as a result of rising inflation, which is squeezing 
disposable incomes." 
 
Yet, there are considerable clouds on the horizon: 
 
x contagion in the eurozone debt crisis as the fears 
of default on sovereign debt spreads from Greece 
to Spain and perhaps other peripheral eurozone 
countries, risks damaging bank lending, market 
and business confidence; 
 
x fears of a slowdown in the growth of the Chinese 
economy as consumer price inflation takes hold; 
 
x continuing uncertainty on the effects of the "Arab 
spring" with implications for oil prices and trade; 
 
x the continuing weakness of the US economy and 
its effect on world trade; 
 
x household expenditure is likely to continue to 
remain weak due to the continuing fiscal 
consolidation and the squeeze on real disposable 
incomes from the current high level of energy 
prices; 
 
x consumer price inflation is above target and is 
likely to remain so for some time, household 
disposable incomes are being squeezed as a 
result, all of which runs the risk of a rise in 
inflationary expectations and strengthened wage 
claim, but there is little sign that this is happening 
with the demand for labour still relative weak 
earnings growth remain at around 2% p.a. 
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It is against this background that we have prepared our 
latest forecasts. 
 
GVA forecasts 
Table 5 presents our forecasts for Scottish GVA - GDP at 
basic prices - for 2011 to 2013. As before we present a 
central forecast, which we hold to be most probable and 
high growth and low growth forecasts which define the 
range of outcomes in which Scottish growth is likely to fall. 
In the subsequent discussion we concentrate mainly on the 
central forecast. The full forecasts are presented in the 
Forecasts of the Scottish Economy section of this 
Commentary below. 
 
Positive growth continues to be forecast in all years and on 
all 3 scenarios. However, Table 5 shows that we have 
revised downwards our central forecast for 2011 and 2012 
reflecting the weakening in the economy that has been 
observed in recent months. Household spending is being hit 
by the debt overhang, the decline in real disposable  
 
 
Table 5:  Forecast Scottish GVA growth in three scenarios, 2011-2013 
 
 
GVA Growth (% per annum) 
  
2011 
  
2012 
  
2013 
 
High growth 
 
1.6 
 
2.7 
 
2.8 
March forecast  2.1  2.4  2.6. 
Central  0.8  1.5  1.9 
March forecast  1.0  1.6  1.9 
Low growth  0.3  0.8  1.0 
March forecast  0.3  0.6  0.9 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Forecast Scottish net jobs growth in three scenarios, 2011-2013 
 
 
GVA Growth (% per annum) 
  
2011 
  
2012 
  
2013 
 
High growth 
 
36,317 41,882 
 
60,675
March forecast  42,626  51,025  57,262 
Central  20,600 18,548  39,849
March forecast  19,780  31,741  39,808 
Low growth  9,621 2,661  21,431
March forecast  5,895  11,586  19,256 
 
 
incomes as inflation moves further ahead  of earnings, and 
uncertainties about job prospects as the fiscal consolidation 
starts to bite and the economy slows. Our forecasts remain 
below the OBR and consensus forecasts for the UK in 2011, 
2012 and 2013, which largely reflects the weaker growth of 
household spending in Scotland and a sluggish outlook for 
private sector investment. This year, we are forecasting 
growth of 0.8%, and 1.5% in 2012 both less than our March 
forecast. We expect that production and manufacturing 
output will continue to pick up reasonably strongly, but at a 
slightly lesser rate than in our previous forecast with 
production growing at 3.6% in 2012 compared to 4% in our 
March forecast. The service sector is forecast to continue on 
its weak growth path growing by 0.5% this year, 1.1% in 
2012 and 1.3% in 2013, largely due to the weakness in the 
growth of household expenditure. Construction also 
continues to exhibit weak growth of 0.5% in 2011, 0.9% in 
2012, and 1.1% in 2013, reflecting cut backs in government 
capital spending and weak private sector investment. 
Finally, our forecast for 2013 continues to predict growth of 
1.9%, just below trend. Over the whole period, the recovery 
continues to be weaker in Scotland than the UK. 
 
Employment forecasts 
Table 6 presents our forecasts for net employee jobs for the 
3 years 2011 to 2013 on the 3 scenarios. 
 
Table 6 indicates that our year-end employee jobs forecast 
for 2011 is broadly similar to our central forecast in March. 
As noted in the previous Commentary after the considerable 
shake-out of jobs at the start of 2010 job creation in 
Scotland has been reasonable buoyant. However, this came 
to an end in the first few months of 2011. Nevertheless, we 
do expect net jobs growth during this year and over the 
forecast horizon. Net jobs grow by 0.9% in 2011, 0.8% in 
2012 and 1.7% in 2013. By 2013 total employee jobs are 
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forecast to be 2,373,000 around 60,000 fewer than in 2007 
but up by 80,000 from the end of 2010. By sector, the 
largest percentage growth in job numbers is forecast for the 
production sectors, but the greatest number of jobs created 
will still be in services, despite the low forecast for output 
growth, due to the sheer scale of the sector. Within 
production, the largest forecast increases are in the Other 
manufacturing industries sector, with smaller increases in 
Mining and quarrying industries, Food and tobacco, Metals 
and metal products, and Electricity, gas and water supply. 
Within services, total employee numbers are forecast to 
rise, as noted above, however there are forecast declines in 
employee numbers in Public administration and defence, 
Education, and the Financial services sector. Some of the 
jobs lost in 2011 in the Financial services are forecast to be 
recovered during 2012 with employee jobs at the end of 
2013 in this sector up slightly compared to the end of 2010. 
 
Unemployment forecasts 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in Table 
7 below. 
 
The ILO rate is our preferred measure since it identifies 
those workers who are out of a job and are looking for work, 
whereas the claimant count simply records the unemployed 
 
 
Table 7: ILO unemployment rate and claimant count rate measures of unemployment under each of the three forecast 
scenarios 
 
  2011  2012  2013 
ILO unemployment    
Rate  8.3%  8.5%  8.2% 
Numbers  216,723  220,350  213,308 
Claimant count       
Rate  5.0% 5.5%  5.3%
Numbers  143,037  158,652  155,714 
 
 
 
who are in receipt of unemployment benefit. We noted in the 
discussion of unemployment in the previous Commentary 
that the degree of labour hoarding may be less in Scottish 
firms.  This could be the consequence of the bigger 
employment shakeout here in the recession and so the 
recovery to date has had a bigger effect on unemployment 
in Scotland  than in the UK. Another factor affecting the 
change in unemployment is the change in the inactivity rate. 
This has been rising in Scotland in recent quarters and so 
has further contributed to falls in unemployment despite 
weak output and, even negative, jobs growth. But we 
continue to expect that the Scottish GDP recovery will 
continue to be weaker and at a rate below that which is 
required - from the estimated Okun relationship - to stabilise 
unemployment. We therefore continue to expect that there 
will still be some pickup in unemployment even as growth in 
output picks up. Unemployment in Scotland this year is 
therefore forecast to rise 8.3%, or 217,000 by the end of the 
year and be largely stable through 2012 with a slight further 
rise to 220,000 by year. After that, the rate should fall to 
8.2% by end 2013. However, as previous quarters have 
demonstrated there is considerable uncertainty around the 
unemployment forecast due to independent variations in 
inactivity rates and the extent to which output change maps 
into job change. 
 
__________________ 
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Summary 
We revise down our forecast for GVA growth in 2011 from 
1.0% to 0.8%. This is due to three factors: weak domestic 
demand; low investment activity and slower growth in world 
trade than was expected earlier this year. Firstly, there is 
ongoing weakness in consumer confidence,  in turn 
damaged by falling real incomes for households due to 
rising inflation rates impacting on spending power. Reduced 
real government spending on current and capital 
expenditures are due to impact on the Scottish economy 
particularly from April 2011, and the impact that this has on 
employment and activity in the public sectors will be critical 
for the short-term outlook. Business investment spending 
appears relatively static from previous periods, but will 
depend on expected demand as well as the availability of 
finances to undertake investment. To the extent that 
external finance sources remain challenging, internal 
financing will require the corporate sector to build up 
balance sheet strength. External demand remains slow, with 
lower growth forecasts for the UK economy as a whole (the 
largest market for Scottish exports) and weaknesses across 
the Euro area driven by sovereign debt concerns and major 
questions about the future path of this economic area. The 
outlook for the Scottish labour market remains poor, with the 
link between economic activity and employment growth 
uncertain, at the same time as some evidence of workers 
exiting the labour market to inactivity. 
 
The Scottish economy 
 
Value added and output 
Figures published on the 20th of April 2011 revealed that 
the Scottish economy declined by 0.4% in the final quarter 
of 2010. This means that the Scottish economy has seen 
three quarters of negative growth in the last six quarters. 
Year on year growth (i.e. the average of the last four 
quarters on the previous four quarters) was +0.8%. Over the 
same basis the UK economy grew by 1.4% through 2010. 
The data reveals that a very strong performance by the 
construction sector in Scotland throughout the first three 
quarters of 2010 had stalled in Q4, falling by 2% in Q4. 
More significantly perhaps for the future strength of the 
economic recovery was the decline across the production, 
construction and services sectors in Q4. Service sectors 
saw growth of -0.1% through 2010, with GVA falling in the 
“Hotels and catering” ( falling by 2.4% in the last four 
quarters on the preceding four quarters), “Transport, storage 
and communication” (-2.3%) and “Other services” (-3.9%). 
The production sectors of the economy grew by 0.5% over 
the year, during which period the same sectors in the UK as 
a whole saw growth of 2.0%.The 0.1% decline in the service 
sectors in Scotland was not matched at the UK level, with 
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GVA increasing by 1.1%. Scotland’s growth performance 
relative to the UK as a whole would have been significantly 
worse had it not been for the better performance of the 
“Construction” sector in Scotland, which grew by 11.2% in 
Scotland, but only 6.0% in the UK as a whole.  
 
Labour market 
The most recent figures for the Scottish labour market at the 
end of 2010 are discussed in greater detail in the Labour 
market section of this month’s Commentary. Prime among 
the recent trends in the labour market however was a 
continuing fall in the unemployment rate from previous 
quarters, down to 7.7 % of the economically active (16+) 
population in the quarter to April 2011. The total 
economically active of working age has fallen significantly 
(down 22,000 in the last six months), employment 
increasing by 2 thousand people, and the number of 
unemployed (but in the labour force) falling by 24,000 in the 
last two quarters. The movement between labour force and 
inactivity remains a complex issue, with the path that this 
takes critical for the forecasted performance of the labour 
market.  
 
Total weekly hours worked continue to show that 
underemployment of labour in employment, i.e. through 
working less hours, remains a feature of the Scottish labour 
market, particularly for full-time workers. The number of total 
weekly hours worked to September 2010 was 2.9% lower 
than the same period one year earlier. 
 
The claimant count level has risen since the start of the 
year, and remains higher than throughout 2010. The 
number of people out of work and receiving Jobseekers 
Allowance was up 4,900 in May 2011 compared to May 
2010, rising 1,200 in the last month. As a rate of the number 
of those receiving benefits plus the number of Workforce 
Jobs, the claimant count rate stands at  5.2%. 
 
Prices 
Inflation measures for the UK suggest that prices are 
continuing to rise above the target inflation rate of the Bank 
of England’s Monetary Policy Committee. In June 2011, the 
inflation rate remained at 4.1%, almost 2 percentage points 
above the MPC’s medium term target. High and rising 
commodity and import prices, plus the impact of increased 
VAT accounted for the increase seen in the first quarter of 
the year.  
 
The price of a barrel of oil has increased by almost 70% 
since July 2010, and stands at just under $120 at time of 
writing. This is slightly lower than the price during April. 
Other commodity prices on world markets have surged over 
the last year, under a combination of rising demand and 
falling output from shocks to production. Corn futures are 
trading at 240 euros/m tonne for June delivery, up from 
under 160 euros/m per tonne a year ago, while the price of 
soybeans is trading up almost 40% in the past year. 
 
It appears that the increase in VAT from 17.5% to 20% in 
January 2011 has had a larger impact on CPI measure than 
the previous increase in VAT from 15% to 17.5% in January 
2010. The Bank of England’s latest inflation report cautions 
that it appears that more of the VAT increase was passed 
onto prices paid by consumers than the earlier increase. 
Measures of the CPI inflation excluding VAT, energy and 
commodity prices were below the 2% target as spare 
capacity in the UK put downward pressure on domestic 
prices.  
 
There are no official measures of inflation in Scotland. As for 
evidence of different consumer inflation rates within the UK, 
recent evidence from the Institute of Fiscal Studies reported 
differences in the inflation experienced by people on low 
incomes or in “benefit dependent” households. By their 
calculations, while no income group saw consistently higher 
average inflation than any other group in every year of their 
sample period, “lower income households had higher 
inflation rates over the last decade than higher-income 
households”.  
 
Wage growth remains relatively flat in Great Britain as a 
whole, with average weekly earnings growth around 2%, 
down from pre-recession growth of closer to 4%. The lack of 
comparable data on Scotland limits the extent to which we 
can say that wage pressures are different in Scotland than 
the UK as a whole. As a simple comparison, however, 
average weekly earnings have risen slower in the private 
sector than the public sector since the start of 2009, so, with 
a slightly higher public share of employment in Scotland, it 
would appear likely that in the Scottish economy as a whole 
average weekly earnings growth has been stronger than in 
the UK as a whole (although still weak).  
 
House prices in Scotland have been reported by the Lloyds 
TSB Scotland House Price Monitor, to have “return[ed] to 
the prices of four years ago”, having fallen by 3.6% in the 
first three months of 2011. The average value of a house in 
Scotland is now £153,335. The number of housing 
transactions rose in March, but remains very low by the 
standard of pre-recession years. The link between house 
prices and consumer spending remained unexamined for 
Scotland, but evidence for the UK (published by the ONS in 
2006) suggests that if there was any link between these 
variables, this may have weakened during the early part of 
the 2000s.  
 
Surveys of business and consumer confidence 
The survey evidence for Scotland is discussed in great 
detail in the “Review of Scottish Business Surveys” section 
of this Commentary. Broadly these appear to suggest weak 
growth at the start of 2011, with rising production from the 
second half of quarter one. Within manufacturing surveys, 
increased demand was reported, and some employment 
growth, however, also reported were  rising cost pressures, 
particularly from commodities and energy goods. The 
weakness of consumer demand for household-facing 
operations, coupled with the fiscal spending reductions in 
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this year, and the additional impact of the Supplementary 
Tax charge on the Oil and Gas sector introduced in the 
March 2011 Budget, all appear to have a constrained effect 
on growth in this early part of 2011. 
 
The Bank of Scotland’s Purchasing Managers’ Index for 
May 2011 reported continuing inflationary pressures, while 
output growth was slower and a decline in the level of new 
business reported. This PMI reported a slowdown in the rate 
of growth in the private sector, although this was still 
positive. Workforce growth reported was positive compared 
to some regions of the UK (Wales, Northern Ireland), but 
slower than most English regions.  
 
Within manufacturing, Scottish Engineering, the Scottish 
Chambers Business Survey and the Bank of Scotland PMI 
all suggested an improvement in activity, with some signs of 
faster growth in Scotland than in the UK as a whole.  The 
surveys would appear to indicate an anticipated uptick in 
demand continuing in the second half of 2011, albeit 
perhaps with declining margins on production. 
 
Surveys of the construction sector reported weak and falling 
confidence in Q1 2011, with the exception of infrastructure 
and non-housing repair and maintenance. With squeezing 
margins due to rising costs, and public capital spending 
projects likely to see large falls in expenditure through the 
latter half of 2011, the outlook for the sector remains poor in 
the short-term. 
 
Retail surveys give some indication of the state of consumer 
confidence in Scotland. On this basis, the weak trend in 
sales growth in Q1 and the fact that no firm expects an 
overall increase in total sales gives severe cause for 
concern. 
 
Trends in drivers of the economy 
 
Consumption  
The macro-indicators for consumption indicate that 
consumption spending is recovering slightly, or at least is no 
longer declining on an annual basis. Figures for 
consumption spending on an annual basis show that 
spending in Scotland grew slightly more than spending in 
the UK as a whole in 2010. The savings ratio for Scottish 
households has fallen from its high in 2009Q2 of 8.8%, 
although is now below its average figure for the period since 
1998. Consumption spending remains weak, and is unlikely 
to be the source of significant growth over the short term. 
 
The Retail Sales Index for Scotland reported on the 4th of 
May 2011, that the first quarter of 2011 had seen a decline 
of 0.3% in real terms. Retail Sales in Great Britain as a 
whole were flat (+0.0%) over the same period, showing a 
weaker growth in Scotland.  
 
In June, the Scottish Retail Consortium (SRC) revealed that, 
after relatively strong sales in April in part driven by weather 
and holiday periods, sales in May 2011 fell by their largest 
amount since the survey started in 1999. Like for like sales 
values were down 3.2%, while total sales were down by 
1.1%. Both these declines are greater than in the UK as a 
whole, where sales values were down 2.1% on a like-for-like 
basis and total sales were down 0.3%, the SRC reported. 
 
The outlook for private spending remains mixed. The Bank 
of England’s “Inflation Report” from May notes that low 
interest rates could act as a spur to consumption, however 
to the extent that households are unwilling to spend their 
savings in order to protect against future unemployment or 
increased prices this will not occur, despite the actions of 
the MPC. It will likely be some more quarters until we know 
if households are adjusting their levels of desired savings to 
a higher level than prior to the recession. The feed through 
from unemployment fears (and possible realisations) and 
cost anxiety to reduced consumption spending is likely to be 
a feature of the Scottish and UK economies over the 
medium term. 
 
Government spending 
As we noted in March’s Economic Commentary, the 
Scottish Parliament approved its one year Budget for 2011-
12. The total size of the budget for the year is £33,620 
million (Total Managed Expenditure), split between 
Resource Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) of 
£25,400 million, Capital DEL of £2,607 million and Annually 
Managed Expenditure of £5,612 million. While resource 
spending has been reduced in real terms, the most 
significant percentage reductions have fallen upon capital 
spending in the financial year 2011-12.  The implications of 
this for overall investment spending is discussed in the next 
section. The challenge for the public sector in continuing to 
provide levels of service while undergoing significant 
reductions in income, particularly after a period of relatively 
strong growth of public resource – as well as capital – 
spending.  A three-year freeze in public sector pay for those 
earning over £21,000 appears to be the significant way by 
which employment in the public sector may be protected at 
a time of reductions in public sector budgets. The most 
recent data for Scotland on the numbers employed in the 
public sector are discussed in the Labour market section of 
this commentary. 
 
The UK Government announced its Budget in March 2011. 
Its policy decisions in this budget were broadly cost neutral 
over the five year policy window. Of the major changes to 
public revenues and expenditures announced here – rather 
than at the Comprehensive Spending Review in October 
2010 – were the following. 
 
On the government debit side, the major changes were to: 
 
x Reduce fuel duty by 1 pence per litre from 23 
March 2011 (costing 2,100 million per year by 
2015-16); 
x Reduce corporation tax to 26% from 2011, with a 
plan to reduce down to 23% by 2014-15 (costing 
1,075 million per year by 2015-16); 
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x Increase personal income tax allowances by £630 
in 2012-3 with adjustment to basic rate limit 
(costing 1,230 per year by 2015-16); 
x Tax reform to “Controlled Foreign Company” rules 
(costing £840 million per year by 2015-16). 
 
These changes were offset by revenue raising decisions 
including: 
 
x Increasing the supplementary charge  on North 
Sea Oil from 20% to 32%, and restricting 
decommissioning relief from 2011-12 (raising 
£1,780 million in 2011-12, rising slightly over each 
of the four years from this level); 
x Indexing direct taxes to CPI from RPI (raising 
£1,080 million per year by 2015-16); 
x Bank levy (raising £630 million in 2011-2, falling to 
£100 million by 2015-16); 
x Changes to raise revenue from tax avoidance, tax 
evasion and administration, raising a total of 
£1,335 million by 2015-6, predominantly from 
raising revenue from “Disguised remuneration”. 
 
Changes to the supplementary tax on activities in the North 
Sea have prompted significant debate between the industry 
and governments about the impact that these changes will 
have on exploration and drilling activity, with knock-on 
effects on the economies from reduced activity, and also a 
lower tax take. 
 
Investment 
While investment spending appears to have recovered 
strongly through 2010 (witness the large increases in the 
construction sector seen throughout the year), this could 
have been necessary following the complete collapse of 
investment during the recession – the low base made for 
significant increases during the normal replacement and 
maintenance of the capital stock, perhaps, and also the 
“green-lighting” of new projects delayed from 2008-9.  
 
Where the outlook for demand for goods and services is 
weak, it is likely that private investment will be sluggish, 
however this will also be affected by the abilities of firms to 
raise the appropriate finance for investment projects. March 
2011 saw the publication of the latest “SME Access to 
Finance” survey, which examines the credit availability in 
the Scottish SME sector, which accounts for 53% of all 
employment in the Scottish economy. This now gives the 
fourth in a series of surveys of this crucial part of the 
Scottish economy.  
 
This survey paints a mixed picture. Demand for new 
borrowing has fallen compared to previous surveys, in part 
due to respondents revising down their growth objectives. 
Further, while credit conditions appear to have eased for 
those renewing credit facilities, access to new credit 
remains difficult. Of course, the extent to which firms require 
external credit will depend upon firms’ positions with regard 
to internal funds. One potentially critical issue is the 
availability of credit for firms exporting, where a higher than 
average rejection rate for new credit could limit the ability of 
Scottish firms to unlock export markets. 
 
The Scottish Load Fund, setup with £40 million of private 
capital and a commitment of £55 million from the public 
sector intends to fill some of the gaps in SME finance 
availability. It was due to begin making loans of between 
£250,000 and £5million to established SMEs, with a 
preference for exporting firms. The Business Growth Fund, 
comprised of equity investment from five major UK banks, is 
an alternative model for private financing of investment, with 
loans of between £2 and £10million available to firms with 
turnovers between £10 million and £100 million. A of May 
2011, the BGF was considering its first investments. 
 
As well as private investment, government as a consumer of 
investment projects has seen significant retrenchment over 
the Budget in June 2010 and October 2010’s 
Comprehensive Spending Review. The bringing forward of 
Government capital spending in Scotland means that there 
is a larger decline in public capital spending in 2011-2 than 
would otherwise be the case, however, capital spending in 
2010-11 was protected. The bulk of the “hit” to capital 
spending in Scotland suggested by the CSR is projected to 
occur in 2011-2, with significantly smaller declines in future 
years (indeed a small upturn in capital spending in the final 
year of the CSR period). This is likely to have a significant 
impact on Scottish construction and other (non-public) 
activities. Ambitions by the Scottish Government to bring 
forward plans to borrow in order to fund capital projects – 
such as the Forth Road Bridge, could go some way to 
alleviating this decline in capital spending. 
 
Exports to the rest of the UK 
Growth in the rest of the UK remains critical for the export 
performance of Scottish firms, being responsible for over 
two-thirds of all Scottish exports in 2009. UK growth has 
typically been stronger than in Scotland over the last few 
quarters, with Q1 2011 showing a 0.5% increase. The 
terrible weather before Christmas meant that some 
expenditures were delayed into Q1, meaning that the rate of 
underlying growth in the economy over Q1 was broadly flat. 
Output in the construction sector which had provided strong 
growth during 2010 fell sharply in Q1, while manufacturing 
and services sector growth in Q1 was around 0.5%, 
excluding the effects of snow. 
 
The Office for Budget Responsibility updated their forecasts 
for the UK economy in March 2011. Since their November 
2010 forecasts, they noted the fall in Q4 2010 GDP, the rise 
in world oil prices and continued higher than expected 
inflation. They note that “these data have on average 
prompted external forecasters to reduce their estimates of 
economic growth in 2010 and 2011. The average external 
forecasts for CPI and RPI inflation have risen significantly, 
again reflecting recent data” (p. 11). They predict that “this 
recovery will be weaker than the recoveries of the 1980s 
and 1990s… [reflecting] the effects of the fiscal 
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consolidation, the relatively slow easing of tight credit 
conditions and ongoing private sector deleveraging” (p. 12). 
Their forecasted UK  growth is again reliant on business 
investment and net trade, with a slight revision downwards 
of prospects for domestic demand, given continued 
squeezing of household budgets. 
 
The OBR’s forecasts for UK GDP growth in 2011 has been 
revised down by 0.4 per cent to 1.7 per cent, while the 2012 
forecast has been revised down by 0.1 per cent to 2.5 per 
cent. This forecast for 2011 is 0.2 above the average of 
independent forecasts from June 2011, while the OBR’s 
forecast for 2012 is 0.3 above the same average of 2012 
forecasts. Within demand components of GDP, the OBR’s 
household spending forecasts for 2011 and 2012 has been 
revised down by 0.7 per cent to only 0.6 per cent in 2011, 
while general government consumption and investment has 
been revised upwards. No changes have been made to the 
contribution anticipated from net exports. 
 
Upward revisions have been made to the UK ILO 
unemployment rate which is forecast to reach 8.2% at the 
end of 2011, and 8.1% at the end of 2012, before falling 
slightly to 7.6% at the end of 2013. 
 
Exports to the rest of the world 
The most frequent survey of Scottish exports to the rest of 
the world is the Index of Manufactured Exports. The most 
recent results revealed that Scottish manufactured exports 
fell by 0.3% in real terms during Q4 2010, and increased by 
1.6% in 2010 on 2009 levels (on a four quarters on the 
previous four quarters basis). Of the annual figure, a 
positive increase in exports was observed in all sectors, with 
the exception of Engineering and Allied Industries. This one 
sector is, however, responsible for over 41% of 
manufactured exports from Scotland. The strong export 
performance of the “Food, drink and tobacco” sector – 
growing by 4.9% in 2010 – shows that the export-led growth 
prospects for Scotland are perhaps not being equally felt 
across Scottish manufacturers.  
 
Worldwide, the outlook for growth remains mixed. In the US, 
non-farm payrolls rose in the most recent month, albeit 
weakly, while the unemployment rate remained at 9.1%. 
The US economy grew in the first quarter of 2011 by an 
annualised rate of 1.8%, while inflation concerns continued 
as inflation grew to 3.6%, driven by increases in commodity, 
energy service and food prices. In the Euro area, overall 
growth on an annual basis appears relatively strong at 2.5% 
in Q1 2011, but this masks a divergence in the growth 
outcomes within the area. By the latest figures to Q4 2010, 
real GDP in Ireland, Greece and Estonia were around 15 
percentage points below its Q1 2008 figure, while in 
Slovenia, Italy, Portugal and Spain output was down by 
between 5 and 10 percentage points. 
 
Growth in the Euro Area, a key market for many Scottish 
products, remains uncertain, and there are concerns about 
a two-speed Euro Area with growth in “core” countries 
expected to exceed that in the struggling “periphery”. 
Continued worries about sovereign debt and the 
sustainability of public finances and banking reforms, the 
lack of the ability to improve the competitiveness indicate 
severe challenges in these economies, and by implication 
the Euro project as a whole, over the medium term. 
 
The recent outbreak of E-coli in European vegetables, 
initially suspected to have begun in Spanish cucumbers, 
and now most likely to have originated at a German 
beansprout farm, has – as well as its fatal effect on humans 
(with 34 deaths and 812 cases at time of writing – 
significantly undermined confidence of consumers of 
European vegetables. At one stage Russia imposed a 
blanket ban on all imports of vegetables from the EU. While 
agricultural exports from Scotland are low (exports of 
produced food are less than 2% of all manufacturing 
exports, while the Global Connections Survey reported that 
in 2009, “Agricultural, forestry and fishing” products 
comprised 1.2% of all Scottish exports), it is possible that 
consumers would avoid products from markets where 
affected foods have been found – these include Germany, 
France, Denmark and Sweden. Such disruptions, to the 
extent that new tastes are developed for the new types of 
produce and hysteresis results, could lead to permanent 
step changes in exports. It is also possible that new export 
markets may not contribute to agricultural sales in the UK, 
but UK and Scottish consumers could switch demand to UK-
grown vegetables. 
 
The GDP growth forecasts for 2011 and 2012 for the top 
five export markets for Scottish goods and services in 2009 
are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: GDP growth forecasts for 2011 and 2012 for top 
five export markets for Scottish products in 2009, % 
year on year change, plus United Kingdom and Euro 
area 
 Share of 
Scottish 
exports 
ROW  
2009 
2011 2012 
 
 
IMF, 
May  
 
OECD, 
May  
 
IMF, 
May 
 
OECD, 
May 
USA 15.5% 2.8% 2.6% 2.9% 3.1% 
Netherlands 9.6% 1.5% 2.3% 1.5% 1.9% 
France 7.5% 1.6% 2.2% 1.8% 2.1% 
Germany 6.1% 2.5% 3.4% 2.1% 2.5% 
Belgium 4.0% 1.7% 2.4% 1.9% 2.0% 
Others      
Asia 9.8% 8.4%1 n/a 8.4%1 n/a 
      
European  
Union 
n/a 1.8% 2.0% 2.1% 2.0% 
United 
Kingdom 
n/a 1.7% 1.4% 2.3% 1.8% 
Sources:  International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Europe: 
Strengthening the Recovery, May 2011, International Monetary Fund, World Economic  
Outlook, April 2011 and OECD Economic Outlook No. 89, May 2011. 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY                          
 Forecast accuracy  
Economic forecasts are often criticised for being inaccurate, i.e. the predicted outcome differs from the actual outcome. This is a 
valid criticism of forecasts, obviously, given that one purpose of economic forecasting is to attempt to predict the future values of 
specific variables.  
 
As part of an ongoing process of evaluating our economic forecasts we discuss here the difference between our forecast for 
2010 growth published in March 2011, and that which was revealed by the published data in April 2011. Our forecasts was for 
growth in 2010 of +1.04% (which was published as +1.0) while the outcome figure for growth was +0.84. The absolute difference 
therefore between our forecast and the outcome was -0.21%.  
 
We can separate out three reasons why the outcome data was different to that which we had forecast. Firstly, while growth in 
Q1-Q3 was known in March 2011, growth in Q4 was not. Mis-forecasting growth in Q4 would therefore lead to a difference 
between the annual growth forecast and outcome data for 2010. Secondly, there are revisions made to the GVA series as more 
information reveals the previous pattern of growth in the Scottish economy. Such revisions are a regular feature of all published 
economic statistics, and the growth figures for Scotland are no different1. Revisions to previous data are therefore another reason 
why forecast outcomes may not arise in actual outcome data (these can occur as we do not forecast revisions to past growth 
data, which seems sensible given the good quality of the Scottish GVA series). 
 
We see that the absolute difference between our 2010 forecast and actual 2010 growth outcomes can be explained by a 
combination of own forecasting error for Q4 2010 and by revisions to past data. The major revision in the data published 
alongside Q4 2010 data was the revision of growth in Q1 2010 from 0.0% to -0.2%. Other revisions to the GVA series had the 
effect of slightly increasing the outturn growth for 2010. These are shown in Figure B1 below. Note the scale on the axis refers to 
percentage points: these are all small differences in absolute terms. One interesting result of this is that we can see that without 
the revision to Q1 2010, the outcome would have been annual growth 0.15 percentage points higher. Growth would therefore 
have been rounded to 1.0% - which would have had the impact of making our forecasts appear accurate despite our error in 
forecasting growth in Q4 2010. 
 
We are continuing to examine our past forecast accuracy and will report on this in more detail in the next commentary. 
 
Figure B1: Importance of forecast inaccuracy and revisions for difference between 2010 forecast 
and outcome 
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Notes: 
1 A paper published in December 2010 by the Scottish Government showed that in the five years to Q2 2010 the mean revision between quarterly 
GVA growth and its value one quarter and one year later was approximately zero, i.e. the first estimate of GVA growth was neither biased greater 
or lower than the outcome growth rate. The absolute mean revision was 0.1 percentage points after one quarter and 0.2 percentage points after a 
year. 
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Forecasts of the Scottish economy 
As with the forecasts published in the last seven 
Commentaries, we give three alternative scenarios for 
growth, employment and unemployment in the Scottish 
economy from 2011 to 2013. We give a “Central” case, with 
“High growth” and “Low growth” as two respectively upper 
and lower growth alternatives. We intend these to capture 
the range of outcomes that are possible, given that there are 
considerable uncertainties surrounding any specific single or 
point estimates. While we do not give explicit probabilities 
for each of these outcomes, we see the “Central” scenario 
as being that which is most likely, while “High growth” and 
“Low growth” reveal the possible range of outcomes for the 
Scottish economy.. We will know the outcome for Scottish 
GVA growth in 2011 with the publication of Q4 2011 figures 
in April 2012. 
 
The forecasts: Detail 
In the three scenarios considered, the following elements 
are assumed to influence the demand for goods and 
services produced, and therefore the levels of economic 
activity, in the Scottish economy: 
 
Households 
In the Central scenario we forecast that household spending 
increases by 0.4% in 2011 and rises by 1.0% and 1.4% in 
2012 and 2013 respectively. This is lower than the growth in 
household spending predicted by the OBR over this period. 
Three factors bear on this comparison being plausible. 
Earnings growth is anticipated to recover more strongly in 
the private sector than in public sector activities, where pay 
restraint is evident. As fears about job security for some, 
and slow income growth for public sector workers is 
revealed, the prospects for household expenditure remains 
weak. This could affect Scotland particularly badly with 
typically higher levels of public sector employment than the 
UK as a whole. Savings rates are anticipated to remain 
above levels seen prior to 2009 as households rebalance 
their debt levels and are reluctant to take on borrowing for 
consumption. High inflation in particular damages those on 
low and fixed incomes especially badly, with spending 
power of these households likely to be squeezed over the 
medium term, allied to the scheduled reductions in welfare 
spending affecting household incomes towards the end of 
the forecast period. Household spending is forecast to be 
closer to the OBR forecasts for the UK, in the High growth 
scenario, although for the reasons discussed above this is, 
in our opinion, an unlikely path for household spending in 
Scotland. 
 
Government 
In the Central scenario we anticipate real reductions in 
government current spending of 2.4% in 2011, -1.0% in 
2012 and -1.9% in 2013. It remains the case that where 
government spending supports economic growth and 
activity will be through careful targeting of limited funds 
available to it, with declines in employment in public sectors 
likely by the end of the forecast period. 
 
Investment 
We reported in March’s commentary that it appeared that 
investment spending in Scotland had responded later and 
fallen less than investment spending in the UK as a whole. 
This would be consistent with public sector projects being 
encouraged at a time of private investment projects being 
delayed, as appears to have occurred through 2009 and the 
first part of 2010 in the UK. The outlook for private 
investment appears to be relatively sluggish, with demand 
signals weak, with the exception of some export sectors. As 
private investment remains weak, the state of public 
investment remains poor with significant reductions in 
capital expenditures front loaded in 2011-2. Overall, we 
forecast investment spending to fall in real terms by 1.1% in 
2011, before rising by 6.6% and 6.4% in 2012 and 2013 
respectively. 
 
Exports 
In the Central scenario, we forecast a relatively strong ROW 
export growth by historic standards of almost 5% growth in 
2011, increasing slightly in the two years subsequent. We 
would anticipate stronger performance in those sectors’ 
exports to the rest of the world, rather than serving domestic 
or even UK markets. Even in ROW exporting sectors, 
however, continuing worries about the strength of the global, 
and particularly Euro area, recovery may mitigate some of 
the earlier hopes for immediate export led-growth. This is 
particularly given the lack of a significant rebound in exports 
from the increased competitiveness of the pound making 
Scottish exports cheaper on the international market. 
Exports to the rest of the UK grow relatively slower in 
comparison, broadly tracking UK domestic demand 
forecasts. For the real growth of UK exports, we anticipate 
growth of under 2% in each of the next three years, broadly 
as the UK consumer is likely to be a key part of the demand 
for Scottish goods and services, and incomes and 
expenditures are forecast to recover growth very slowly. 
 
Tourism 
Tourism spending is forecast to remain slower to recover 
than household spending as a whole through the forecast 
period. Discounting appears to remain a key feature of the 
Scottish tourist market, with occupancy levels remaining 
solid despite significant price reductions. It is likely that 
business spending on trips may recover as business growth 
picks up towards the end of the forecast horizon, however 
domestic spending on tourism activities – the key part of the 
market in Scotland – is likely to remain sluggish, with 
exceptions perhaps in niche sectors of the industry. 
 
Results 
All three scenarios forecast Scottish GVA growth for the 
calendar years 2011 to 2013. As before, we are forecasting 
year-on-year growth, so will know the accuracy of our 
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forecasts with the publication of Q4 data for each year, 
typically around the April of the subsequent year. The 
difference between our forecast for 2010 growth reported in 
March 2011 and the outturn growth rate for 2010, as 
revealed by the publication of Q4 2010 data in April 2011, is 
discussed in the Box above. 
 
The three scenarios – Central, High and Low – are 
presented in Figure 1, alongside (for comparison only) the 
forecasts for the UK over the same period by the Office for 
Budget Responsibility (reported in March 2011). Forecasts 
for UK growth in 2011 and 2012 from City and non-City 
forecasters were collated in June 2011 and these are 
included for comparison. Also included is the independent 
average of new forecasts for the UK between 2011 and 
2013, dating from May 2011. The average of UK growth 
forecasts for 2011 has been revised down between May 
2011 and June 2011 from 1.7% to 1.5%, reflecting the 
underlying weakness observed during Q1 data for the UK. 
 
Figure 1: GVA growth for Scotland, 2005 to 2010 and forecasts for 2010 to 2013, annual real % 
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Table 2:  Main forecasts of the Scottish economy (Central scenario), 2011 to 2013, % change from 
four quarters of previous calendar year 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
Gross Value Added 0.8% 1.5% 1.9% 
    
Production 2.2% 3.6% 4.3% 
Services 0.5% 1.1% 1.3% 
Construction 0.5% 0.9% 1.1% 
 
 
 
Table 3: Forecasts of GVA growth in three scenarios, 2011 to 2013 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
High growth 1.6% 2.7% 2.8% 
Central 0.8% 1.5% 1.9% 
Low growth 0.3% 0.8% 1.0% 
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Our Central forecast for growth in 2011 is now 0.8%, down 
from the 1.0% forecast in March 2011. This revision largely 
reflects more cautious outlook regarding household finances 
and expenditure plans in light of continuing uncertainty 
about employment security, the full impact of the fiscal 
consolidation and real incomes being reduced by higher 
than anticipated inflation. Our forecast for 2012 is lowered 
(by 0.1%) from March’s forecast, and is now for growth of 
1.5%. Our forecast for 2013 remains unchanged from 
March’s Commentary at 1.9% under the Central scenario. 
Forecast headline growth in all three scenarios are shown in 
Table 2. 
 
As before, we present forecasts for growth over the forecast 
period at broad industry groupings. Figure 2 gives the GVA 
changes in “production” sectors (classified as categories 
CDE of SIC 2007), while Figure 3 and Figure 4 give the 
GVA changes forecast in “construction” (category F) and 
“services” (categories G-P). These figures have been put on 
the same vertical axis scale, to ease comparison in the 
growth forecasts across these broad sectoral groupings. 
 
Figure 2: Forecasts of GVA growth in Production under three scenarios, 2011 to 2013 
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Figure 3: Forecasts of GVA growth in Construction sector under three scenarios, 2011 to 2013 
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Figure 4: Forecasts of GVA growth in Services sectors under three scenarios, 2011 to 2013 
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Employment 
Our forecasts for employment in Scotland for each of the 
years from 2011 to 2013 are given in Table 4 below. These 
forecasts are for (seasonally adjusted) employee jobs at the 
end of the year reported, rather than full-time equivalent job 
numbers or other measures of employment (e.g. workforce 
jobs). As with the GVA, we can assess the accuracy of our 
employment forecasts by examining the number of 
employee jobs in the quarter ending December.  These are 
published early in the following year, with some revisions 
over the first half of the subsequent year as more complete 
data are available. As of December  
2010, the number of employee jobs in Scotland stood at just 
under 2.3 million, and by the end of Q1 2011 had risen by 
30 thousand to 2,325 thousand.  
 
The major difference between employee and workforce jobs 
are that self-employment is included in workforce, but not 
employee jobs. Since these figures are job numbers, rather 
than the numbers in employment, these figures differ slightly 
from those reported in the labour market section of the 
Commentary.  
 
 
 
Table 4:  Forecasts of Scottish employee jobs (000s) and net change in employee jobs in Central 
scenario, 2011 to 2013 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
    
Total employee jobs (000s), Dec 2,315 2,334 2,373 
  Net annual change (jobs) 20,600 18,548 39,849 
% change from previous year 0.9% 0.8% 1.7% 
    
Agriculture (jobs, 000s) 33 34 36 
  Annual change 748 981 1,493 
Production (jobs, 000s) 230 237 248 
  Annual change 6,171 7,380 11,257 
Services (jobs, 000s) 1,915 1,925 1,950 
  Annual change 12,489 9,605 25,249 
Construction (jobs, 000s) 137 137 139 
  Annual change 1,192 582 1,850 
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In our Central scenario, we therefore forecast that the 
number of jobs in Scotland at the end of 2011 will be 2,315 
thousand. This is down slightly on the number of employee 
jobs in the first quarter of 2011. Within sectors, the largest 
percentage growth in jobs numbers is forecast for the 
production sectors, which are forecast to increase employee 
jobs by the end of 2011 by over six thousand. Services jobs 
are forecast to continue to expand slightly, and continue to 
provide the majority of the employee jobs growth over the 
year. Within production, the largest increases are forecast to 
be seen in the “Other manufacturing industries” sector, with 
smaller increases in “Mining and quarrying industries”, 
“Food and tobacco”, “Metals and metal products”, and 
“Electricity, gas and water supply”. Within services, total 
employee numbers are forecast to rise, as described above, 
however there are declines in employee numbers forecast in 
“Public administration and defence”, “Education”, and the 
“Financial services” sector. Some of these declines in 
employee jobs in 2011 in the “Financial services” sector are 
recovered during 2012 with employee jobs at the end of 
2013 in this sector up slightly compared to the end of 2010. 
 
In all, the number of jobs in 2011 is forecast to grow by just 
over 20,000 in 2011. In 2012 and 2013 the number of 
employee jobs is forecast to increase by 18,500 and almost 
40,000 respectively. Total jobs at the end of 2013 are 
forecast to be 2,373 thousand, down 60,000 on employee 
jobs at the end of 2007, but up by 80,000 from the end of 
2010. Table 5 shows the net growth in employee jobs 
forecast across each of the three scenarios between 2011 
and 2013. 
 
 
Table 5: Forecast net employee jobs growth in three scenarios, 2011 to 2013 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
    
High growth 36,317 41,882 60,675 
Central 20,600 18,548 39,849 
Low growth 9,621 2,661 21,431 
 
 
Unemployment 
We present our 2011 to 2013 forecasts for unemployment in 
the Central scenario, as measured by the ILO definition, as 
well as those receiving unemployment benefits, in Table 6. 
The preferred measure of unemployment is the ILO 
definition as given by the Labour Force Survey. This 
measure is typically preferred as it gives a better picture of 
the number of employees available for work in the labour 
market, and so a better measure of the spare labour 
capacity there is. One issue with increases in the inactivity 
rates over recent quarters in Scotland is that the 
unemployment rate has fallen despite weak growth, or even 
declines, in employment. The numbers unemployed by the 
ILO measure have typically declined, but there has also 
been increases in the inactivity rate, reducing the size of the 
labour force (and so the denominator in the calculation of 
the unemployment rate).  As before, we would highlight the 
uncertainty around our unemployment estimates as there 
may be some further changes in the activity rates, and the 
size of the labour force as a whole as migration occurs, 
making forecasting more difficult than in more normal times 
for the labour market. 
 
We show the claimant count and ILO unemployment rates 
over the period 1992 to 2010, followed by our forecasts from 
2011 to 2013 in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Forecasts of Scottish unemployment in “Central” scenario, 2010 to 2013 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
    
ILO unemployment 216,723 220,350 213,308 
Rate1 8.3% 8.5% 8.2% 
Claimant count 143,037 158,652 155,714 
Rate2 5.0% 5.5% 5.3% 
 
 
Notes: 1 = rate calculated as total number of unemployed on ILO definition divided by total economically active 16+ population.  
2 
= rate calculated as claimant count divided by sum of claimant count and total workforce jobs. The latest figures for ILO unemployment in the 
three months to April 2011 are 207,000, at a rate of 7.7%. The latest figures for claimant count rate in May 2011 (on a provisional estimate) is 
139,300, and a rate of 5.2%. 
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Figure 5: Scottish ILO and claimant count unemployment rate, past and forecast under three 
scenarios 
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Grant Allan,  
17 June 2011 
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Review of Scottish 
Business Surveys  
 
 
 
Overall 
The effects of the harsh winter weather were a common 
theme in most business surveys covering the first quarter of 
2011, with a number of surveys suggesting the Scottish 
economy to all intents stalled in the first quarter, although 
with some pick up in activity from February onwards. 
 
Surveys covering manufacturing reported rising demand, 
activity and limited employment growth, although Oil & Gas 
UK noted a sharp downturn in longer term activity as a 
consequence of the increase in the Supplementary Tax 
charge in the sector.  
 
A general theme in the surveys covering the first half of 
2011 are the rising cost pressures, rising raw material and 
energy costs and, especially in retail and tourism the impact 
of inflation and consumer uncertainty on sales trends.   
 
Surveys covering construction reported declining business 
optimism, pressures on margins and escalating cost 
pressures. 
 
The Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey (Q 1 2011) noted 
that once again for manufacturing firms raw 
material/suppliers prices (86%) and transport costs (65%) 
were the most widely reported cost pressures and for firms 
these pressures are now more evident than in previous 
quarters. More than three quarters of manufacturing, 93% of 
wholesale and 76% of retail respondents reported pressures 
to raise prices due to rising raw material/suppliers’ prices. 
Firms are reporting  increasing transport costs with 86% of 
wholesale, 65% of manufacturing and 67% of retail 
respondents reported rising costs. 
 
Labour market activity remained largely subdued, although 
recruitment activity in construction improved.  Recruitment 
difficulties remained at low levels. Pay increases ranged 
from 2.13% in wholesale to 5.4% in tourism, no construction 
firms reported increasing wages in the first three months of 
2011.  
 
Oil and gas services 
The outlook for the UK oil and gas sector changed markedly 
in the first half of 2011. Without exception, all surveys 
published towards the end of 2010 and before 23rd March 
2011 noted that oil prices were remaining on a slight upward 
trend and the signs were for a relatively stable continuation 
of the world economic recovery. Oil & Gas UK noted that the 
global growth in demand for energy was beginning to 
resume and ‘every credible scenario shows further growth in 
demand for oil and gas over the next twenty years’ (2010:4).  
Further evidence of rising confidence in the sector was 
noted in the Oil & Gas UK quarterly index (Q4 2010) which 
measures a combination of confidence, activity, revenue 
and investment. The overall index in Q4 2010 was the 
highest recorded since the survey began, and recorded 
increases across the sector, both amongst exploration and 
production companies and the supply chain.  
 
In January a major report estimated that investment in the 
UKCS was expected to almost double, with spending 
expected to rise to £7.7 billion, compared with £4.4 billion in 
2010 (Wood Mackenzie, quoted to the Herald 20.1.2011). 
Increasing recognition on the scale and value of 
decommissioning work, the longer term potential of offshore 
renewables and the application by oil and energy 
companies for European Union money to develop a carbon 
capture and storage facility (Shell UK, Petrofac and Scottish 
and Southern Energy) all reinforced the sense of optimism 
and increased activity. 
 
The UK budget in March introduced an unexpected and 
potentially damaging tax increase on UKCS oil companies. 
Both the Chancellor and the OBR took the view that this 
increase would not impact adversely on either investment or 
activity in the UKCS. Claiming this measure was 
‘economically smart’ the chancellor argued ‘with the current 
oil price the prospects are for increased investment’. The 
OBR chairman likewise took the view ‘we are assuming 
there is no significant effect on the investment and 
production profile from that change’. These views were not 
shared by Oil & Gas UK speaking on behalf of the industry, 
international and UK oil producers, investment companies, 
UK and international industry experts and international 
commentators. 
 
The immediate reactions to the tax increase by Oil & Gas 
UK included seeking meetings with ministers and PILOT to 
outline that more frequent and unexpected tax changes 
potentially reduce the attractiveness of the UKCS as a 
location to companies choosing where to invest. It will lead 
to uncertainty and impact on the volume of work and long 
term competitiveness of the supply chain. The tax change 
was seen as hurried and ill informed and with little thought 
as to the potential impacts on investment and hence longer 
term energy supply and employment in the UK. 
 
Evidence from the 14th Oil and Gas Survey (Aberdeen 
Chamber of Commerce) and OGUK oil and gas activity 
survey update (May 2011) indicates a significant decline in 
business confidence and investment plans for the future. 
OGUK suggest the impact of the increase in the 
Supplementary Charge has reduced the probability of some 
60 projects proceeding. These projects have an estimated 
capital investment of £20 billion. ‘In 20 instances 
decommissioning was likely to be accelerated by between 1 
– 5 years’ (OGUK May 2011:2). OGUK suggests this could 
mean a reduction in HM Treasury direct tax receipts of 
between £15 – 20 billion over time if the 25 most at risk 
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projects did not proceed and employment will fall by some 
15,000 over the decade. These conclusions were supported 
by Kemp and Stephen’s analysis of the effects of the 2011 
budget on fields and projects that could be developed over 
the next 30 years as well as on existing sanctioned fields in 
the UKCS concluded that there will be long term reductions 
in field investment and oil/gas production as a consequence 
of the tax increase, and that these changes will reduce 
incentives to pursue exploration projects and reduce the 
ability to finance exploration and development projects. 
 
The additional consequences of the tax changes will be to 
reduce the value of assets and adversely influence 
decisions to commit capital, and as the North Sea becomes 
less attractive investment, staff and assets will increasingly 
flow to other regions. 
 
However, at the time of writing this review rumours were 
emerging that the Government might review the 
Supplementary charge. 
 
Production 
The latest issues of the Lloyds TSB survey covering the 
period November 2010 to February 2011 and with 
expectations to the end of August 2011 suggested the 
recovery was severely interrupted and possibly stalled by 
the adverse winter weather. However, it suggested ‘the 
recovery from recession is likely to resume with 
expectations for the next six months at their highest level for 
three years. Forward looking indicators in the Business 
Monitor show the economy growing in the first half of this 
year. For the six months to August 2011 there are more 
firms (32%) expecting an increase in turnover compared to 
those (26%) expecting a decrease, indicating a return to 
growth from the weather affected last three months of last 
year’. 
 
The Business Monitor noted that cost pressures remained 
high and increasing in the Scottish economy. The overall net 
balance of production businesses experiencing cost 
increases in the last three months is +66%, up significantly 
from the previous quarter and from the same quarter one 
year ago. Expectations for cost increases remain stubbornly 
high among production businesses with a net balance of 
+77%. 
 
Manufacturing 
Once again a common theme of export led growth appears 
to be underpinning improvements in the sector. The Scottish 
Engineering’s Quarterly Review (March and June), SCBS 
(Q1 2011) and the Bank of Scotland PMI noted an 
improvement in manufacturing activity. The BOS – PMI for 
February reported firms recovering from the adverse 
weather. It noted improved demand conditions and an 
increase in new orders levels, although the increase in 
Scotland was weaker than for the UK. The March data 
confirmed the continuing growth in Scottish manufacturing, 
although the rate was lower than in February, data for April 
indicated a continuation of the growth, and the rate 
increased back to that reported in January and with the 
growth rate for Scotland stronger than that recorded for the 
UK as a whole. The May 2011 PMI noted that 
manufacturing activity continued to rise for the fifth 
consecutive month, although the rate of increase slowed. 
 
In common with other surveys the BOS – PMI (February, 
March and April ) noted that input price inflation remained 
high, driven by rising fuel, energy, raw material and wage 
costs, with the pressures accelerating in April.   Input price 
inflation eased in Scotland, although remained above the 
UK average. 
 
Both Scottish Engineering and SBS manufacturing 
respondents anticipate an improvement in demand in the 
second half of 2011, with the net trends in total orders and 
sales expected to be positive, again fuelled by export 
demand.   
 
SCBS respondents noted cost pressures increased further 
in quarter one, raw material and to a lesser extent transport 
costs, continued to cause most concern to firms. 
Nevertheless, the net trend in turnover is expected to 
remain positive over the coming twelve months however a 
net balance of 21% expect profitability to decline. 
 
Construction 
SCBS and Scottish Building Federation construction 
respondents continued to report weak and declining 
business confidence through the first quarter. The Scottish 
Building Federation concluded that ‘any recovery in the 
sector remains slow and bumpy’. Commenting on UK 
figures their chief executive commented ‘ these figures show 
precipitous falls in output from all sectors of the industry in 
the first quarter of this year, with the exception of 
infrastructure and non-housing repair and maintenance – 
most probably as a result of road and other repairs being 
undertaken following the sever weather.’ 
 
A major concern noted by both surveys was the rise in 
costs, the SBF noted that a third of respondents had been 
adversely affected by unexpected cost increases and one in 
12 anticipated losing money as a result of underestimating 
the increase in raw material costs. Both surveys noted the 
increasing pressure on tender margins. 
 
SCBS respondents reported weakening trends in demand 
with orders from all areas declining further during the first 
quarter. More than 70% of firms reported working below 
optimum levels, and, with the exception of orders from the 
public sector, expectations as to contracts over the next 
three months are still expected to ease.   Turnover, tender 
margins and profitability over the next twelve months are 
expected to decline for more than half of responding firms. 
There is much to suggest that expectations continue to be 
influenced by continued speculation concerning reductions 
in public spending. Average capacity improved from 72% to 
77%, an improvement over levels one year ago (65%).  
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Logistics and Wholesale  
Business confidence amongst SCBS wholesale 
respondents remained weak as sales trends continued to 
weaken during the three months to March. More than half of 
firms reported increasing or level sales and the rate of 
decline is expected to ease in Q2. Cost pressures were 
widespread and significant, almost all firms reported 
pressures to raise prices, and more than 80% of 
respondents report rising transport costs and supplier 
prices. Although a net of firms anticipate an improvement in 
trading conditions over the coming year. 
 
Retail distribution 
Once again common themes in the surveys covering the 
Scottish retail sector, in addition to the longer term trends of 
the increase in on line sales and increasing competition 
amongst the major multiple retailers, have been the 
consequences of the harsh winter, food price inflation, cost 
pressures and a lack of consumer confidence dampening 
sales. The Scottish Retail Consortium reported a 0.9% 
decline in like for like sales in January. Sales trends in 
February were weaker with like for like sales down 1.3% on 
the year and trading conditions were described as getting 
‘steadily tougher’ and weak sales were reported in March.  
Rising sales in April, like for like sales up 3.4% were seen 
as reflecting a combination of holidays and inflationary 
pressures. April, however was seen as a blip as The 
Scottish Retail Consortium reported that ‘sales were down 
1.1%, against a 2.4% increase in May 2010. This was the 
worst fall in total sales since the survey began in 1999. Like-
for-like sales values were down 3.2% from May 2010, when 
sales had fallen 0.8%.’ 
 
SCBS respondents (mainly non major multiple retailers) 
reported weak trends in confidence in the first quarter, and 
the trend in sales remained weak with more than three-
quarters reporting and 60% expecting a decline in the total 
value of sales.  Only 7% reported increased sales during the 
first quarter of 2011, and once again continued concerns 
over consumer confidence are moderating sales 
expectations for the coming quarter with no firms expecting 
an overall increase in total sales.   
 
SCBS respondents again reported rising cost pressures, 
especially suppliers’ prices, and pressures to increase 
prices remain high. Firms are coming under more pressure 
from transport costs and regulation costs than in the 
previous quarter. Pressures on margins look set to continue 
with a net of 62% of firms anticipating a weakening trend in 
turnover and a net of 73% expect profitability to decline over 
the next year.  
 
Tourism 
SCBS firms noted a continued weakness in business 
confidence during Q1 2011 as occupancy levels weakened 
and demand declined sharply. Average occupancy declined 
from 56.4% to 46.2%, marginally better than a year ago 
(46.6%).    Demand from Scotland, the rest of the UK, 
abroad and business trade all continued to decline, and the 
declines were greater than had been anticipated by 
respondents from the fourth quarter survey. Total demand 
and demand from the rest of the UK was lower compared to 
Q1 2010. Demand from all areas is expected to decline 
during the second quarter although the rate of decline is 
expected to ease. Trends in bar/restaurant trade and in 
conference/function facilities remained weak. Overall local 
and business demand accounted for 62% of total demand 
and tourist demand accounted for 38% of total demand in 
the first quarter. Visit Scotland data indicates hotel 
occupancy rates of 44% in January, 54% in February and 
58% in March; these figures suggest little improvement in 
either room or bed occupancy for the past 4 years. The 
March figures for self catering and guest house/B & B  
suggest no evidence of an improvement over the past three 
years. 
 
Almost 50% of SCBS respondents reported reducing 
average room rates and the discounting of rates is set to 
continue for almost a third of hotels in the three months to 
the end of June 2011. Once again, 70% reported that the 
lack of tourist demand remained the primary business 
constraint and once again around a third felt that their area 
had suffered due to poor marketing.  
 
Outlook  
The underlying weaknesses in demand and consumer 
spending were again evident. Cost pressures continued to 
rise faster than anticipated and together with rising fuel and 
energy costs will be of increasing concern in the second half 
of 2011.  
 
Manufacturing respondents continue to rely on export 
orders, activity in construction is set to remain weak, and 
much will depend on Government action to stimulate 
activity. In the service sector weak consumer confidence 
and inflation will continue to adversely impact on retail sales 
trends. Activity and occupancy in hotels is little changed 
from previous years, and demand for bar/restaurant facilities 
remains weak.  
 
Rising price pressures and weak demand are expected to 
continue and for many Scottish businesses the combination 
of slow and patchy growth, limited improvements in 
turnover, rising costs, pressures on margins and declining 
trends in profitability will pose real problems in 2011. 
 
Cliff Lockyer/Eleanor Malloy 
June 2011 
 
____________________ 
 
Current trends in Scottish Business are regularly reported by a 
number of business surveys. This report draws on: 
 
1. The Confederation of British Industries Scottish Industrial 
Trends Survey for the first quarter 2011; 
2. Lloyds TSB Business Monitor for the quarter November 
2010 – February 2011and expectations to August  2011; 
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3. Scottish Building Federation press releases; 
 
4. Scottish Engineering’s Quarterly Reviews for the first and 
second quarters of 2011;  
 
5. The Bank of Scotland Markit Economics Regional Monthly 
Purchasing Managers’ Indices for February - May 2011; 
 
6. The Bank of Scotland Markit Economics Report on Jobs 
January 2011; 
 
7. The Scottish Retail Consortium’s KPMG Monthly Scottish 
Retail Sales Monitors for February – May 2011; 
 
8. The Scottish Chambers of Commerce Quarterly Business 
Survey report for the first quarter of 2011;  
 
9. Oil & Gas UK quarterly Index quarters 4 2010, Q1 2011; 
 
10. Oil & Gas UK Activity Survey 2011; 
 
11. Oil & Gas UK Activity Survey May 2011 Update; 
 
12. Visit Scotland Occupancy Survey for February and March 
2011; 
 
13. The Scottish Construction Monitor quarter 4 2010 
 
14. Jackson, P. (2009). The Future of Global Oil Supply: 
Understanding the Building Blocks (CERA); 
 
15. Kemp, A & Stephen, L. (2011)  The effects of Budget 2011 
on Activity in the UK Continental Shelf. North Sea Study 
Occasional Paper no 120. April 2011. University of 
Aberdeen. 
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Overview of the  
labour market 
 
 
Inevitably current interest in the Scottish labour market 
continues to focus on the trends in both employment and 
unemployment figures, a theme developed in other sections 
of this edition.  Public interest continues to focus on public 
sector employment trends and for a further issue we return 
to these themes. Of interest is the impact of patterns and 
behaviour of immigrants to and emigrants from Scotland on 
recent employment patterns, and initially recent findings are 
considered. 
 
Recent trends in migration 
Estimates for population numbers for 2004 – 2009 by 
country of birth and nationality, drawing on the APS have 
recently been published, these show the number of people 
who were born abroad grew to 321,000 in 2009, an increase 
of 117,000 on 2004. These figures exclude students who do 
not have a UK resident parent and people in most other 
types of communal establishments (hotels, hostels, 
boarding houses etc.). Interestingly, a  study of evidence 
from the 2001 census (Census sample of anonymised 
records) (McCollum 2011) suggests that some 40% of 
migrants into Scotland in the twelve months prior to the 
2001 census were Scots born returnees, The study raises 
interesting questions as to whether the trends and 
characteristics of this population will be the same for studies 
covering a later period. 
 
 The latest available data for 2008 – 2009 (Characteristics 
and Intentions of Immigrants to and Emigrants from 
Scotland – Review of Existing Evidence, Scottish 
Government Social Research) suggests that 52% of 
migrants to Scotland came from the rest of the UK (this 
includes Scots born people returning to Scotland) from The 
General Register Office for Scotland (GROS), approximately 
slightly more than a quarter came from elsewhere and 
slightly less than a quarter form the EU. 
 
The majority of immigrants (59%) were aged 16 – 34, 
reflecting the large inflow of students to Scotland. Data from 
the APS also provides information as to the sectoral 
distribution of non UK born Scottish residents. Some 27.5% 
were employed in Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants; 
26.8% in Public Health and Administration; and 15.1% in 
Banking and Finance. The UK occupational pattern 
suggests a higher proportion than UK born residents are 
employed in the lowest occupational group but also in 
professional occupations. A8 statistics, available from the 
Worker Registration Scheme, indicates that of those 
registering between April and June 2010 were most likely to 
be employed in Hospitality and Catering (29%),  
Administration, Business and Management Services (25%) 
(but as the report notes ‘this figure is likely to be inflated as 
all workers employed by employment agencies are included 
under this category, regardless of which sector they are 
working in’ [page 9]), Agriculture and Food (12%), Fish and 
Meat processing (11%). 
 
Recent trends and statistics  
Comparable figures on the labour market between Scotland 
and the United Kingdom in the quarter February – April 
2011 are summarised in Table 1. Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) data show that in the quarter to April the level of 
employment in Scotland fell by 7 thousand, to 2,473 
thousand. Over the year to April 2011, employment in 
Scotland rose by 43 thousand. For the same period, UK 
employment rose by 376 thousand. The Scottish 
employment rate – those in employment as a percentage of 
the working age population – was 70.9 per cent, up 1.1 per 
cent compared to one year earlier.  For the same period the 
UK employment rate was 70.6 per cent, up 0.4 per cent 
compared to one year earlier. Unemployment fell by 10 
thousand, the seventh consecutive month in which 
unemployment has fallen. 
 
In considering employment, activity and unemployment 
rates it is important to remember the bases and 
relationships of these figures.  LFS data is provided for: (1) 
all aged 16 and over and (2) for all aged 59/64. The first 
measure (all aged 16 and over) leads to higher numbers in 
employment, in the total economically active and 
economically inactive – but reduces the economic activity 
rates and unemployment rates, but at the same time 
increases the economically inactive rate. Conversely the 
second measure (all aged 16 to 59/64) leads to lower 
numbers economically active, in employment and 
economically inactive – but leads to a higher economically 
active, employment and unemployment rates but lower 
economically inactive rates. Figures derived from the Labour 
Force Survey differ slightly from those derived from the 
Annual Population Survey. 
 
The relationships between employment, unemployment, 
totally economically active and inactive are important in 
appreciating changing levels of employment and 
unemployment, and changes in the employment rates 
should be seen in conjunction with changes in the activity 
rates.  If people leave employment and become 
unemployed (but are still economically active) the 
unemployment rate increases, but the economically active 
rate remains unchanged. However, if people leave 
employment and do not seek employment, as seems to be a 
continuing pattern, they are categorised as economically 
inactive, as such the unemployment rate remains 
unchanged whilst the activity and inactivity rates change. 
This is clearly shown in table 1. Over the year to April 2011, 
the numbers employed rose by 43 thousand, whilst 
unemployment fell by 10 thousand – and the numbers of 
those aged 16-59/64 who are economically inactive fell by 
25 thousand and the numbers economically active rose by 
33 thousand. 
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Table 1 shows that for Scotland the preferred International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) measure of unemployment eased 
to 207 thousand, between February – April 2011, and fell by 
10 thousand over the year. The ILO unemployment rate 
eased in the three months to April 2011 and now stands at 
7.7 per cent. This represents a 0.3 per cent fall over the last 
quarter and a 0.5 per cent fall relative to the same period a 
year earlier. The comparable ILO unemployment rate for the 
UK also stands at 7.7 per cent, and is down 0.3 per cent 
over the most recent quarter and also down 0.3 per cent 
over the year.  
 
 
Table 1:  Headline indicators of Scottish and UK labour market, October – February – April 2011 
 
February - April 
2011  Scotland 
Change 
on 
quarter 
Change on 
year 
United 
Kingdom 
Change on 
quarter 
Change on 
year 
Employment* 
 
Level (000s) 2,473 -7 43 29,349 80 376 
Rate (%) 70.9 0.0 1.1 70.6 0.1 0.4 
Unemployment** Level (000s)          207  -10 -10 2,430 -88 -57 
Rate (%) 7.7 -0.3 -0.5 7.7 -0.3 -0.3 
Activity* Level (000s)       2,680  -16 33 31,669 -9 319 
Rate (%) 76.9 -0.3 0.8 76.7 -0.1 0.2 
 
Inactivity*** 
 
Level (000s)        785  12 -25 9,368 39 -41 
Rate (%) 23.1 0.3 -0.8       23.3 0.1 -0.2 
 
 
Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, June 2011  
  * Levels are for those aged 16+, while rates are for those of working age (16-59/64) 
 ** Levels and rates are for those aged 16+, rates are proportion of economically active. 
*** Levels and rates for those of working age (16-59/64) 
 
 
The economically active workforce includes those 
individuals actively seeking employment and those currently 
in employment (i.e. self-employed, government employed, 
unpaid family workers and those on training programmes). 
Table 1 shows that the rate of the economically active fell 16 
thousand between February – April 2011. There were 2,680 
thousand economically active people in Scotland during 
February – April 2011. This comprised 2,473 thousand in 
employment and 207 thousand ILO unemployed. The level 
for those of working age but economically inactive rose by 
12 thousand in the latest quarter, but over the year the total 
fell by 25 thousand to 785 thousand people; this indicates a 
fall of 0.8 per cent in the number of people of working age 
economically inactive over the last year.  
 
Data on employment by age, derived from the Annual 
Population Survey, is available up to September 2010. In 
the year to September 2010 employment rates fell for all 
age groups, with the employment rate for those aged 16 – 
64 falling by 1.3 percentage points and with the largest 
percentage point falls being recorded for those aged 16 – 17 
(down 6.0%) and 25 – 34 (down 2.1%). Employment rates 
for men under 50 fell more than those for women, whereas 
employment rates for women aged 50 and above fell more 
than for the equivalent male age groups. Table 2 illustrates 
the changing employment rates by age group for the three 
years October – September 2008 – October – September 
2010 and consistent declines across all age groups. 
 
In the year to September 2010 (the latest available data) 
inactivity amongst 16 – 64 rose by 24 thousand, a 3.1% 
increase over the year and the inactivity rate (16 – 64) stood 
at 23.1%. Inactivity for men aged 16 – 64 rose by 16 
thousand (5.6%) and for women rose by 8 thousand (1.7%).  
Inactivity rose 9.6% for men and by 2.6% for women aged 
16 – 17. Over the year inactivity increased most in the age 
groups 16 – 34.  
 
In the year to September 2010 inactivity rose by 24 
thousand to 785 thousand. The main increases reported for 
the reasons for inactivity over the year were: being a student 
up 11 thousand, by retiring up 6 thousand, long term sick up 
5 thousand; not wanting a job up 22 thousand and other 7 
thousand. The numbers looking after family and home fell 
by 4 thousand and those temporarily sick fell by 3 thousand. 
 
The most recent (seasonally adjusted) figure for Jobseekers 
allowance claimants in Scotland stood at 139.3 thousand in 
May 2011, up 1.2 thousand or 0.9% in the month and up 4.7 
thousand or 3.6% over the year. The claimant count rate at 
May 2011 stood at 5.2 per cent, or 6.8% for men and 3.4% 
for women (note these figures are taken from table 7 in the
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Table 2:  Employment rates thousands (%) People by age for the three years October–September 2008, 
2009 and 2010 
 
 16+ 16 - 64 16 - 17 18 - 24 25 – 34 35 - 49 50 - 64 65+ 
Oct 2007 – Sept 2008 60.9 74.2 40.1 67.9 81.6 83.7 66.0 6.0 
Oct 2008 – Sept 2009 59.4 71.9 37.1 64.4 80.1 82.1 64.6 6.7 
Oct 2009 – Sept 2010 58.2 71.0 31.1 63.7 78.0 81.1 64.2 6.5 
 
 
Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, June 2011  
 
 
Table 3:  Employment, unemployment and inactivity rates by Local Authority Area 2007, 2008 and Oct 2009 
– September 2010 
 
Geography  
(Residence Based) 
Employment rates Unemployment rates 16+* Economic inactivity rates 
2007 2008 
Oct200
9/Sep 
2010 2007 2008 
Oct200
9/Sep 
2010 2007 2008 
Oct2009/
Sep2010 
Scotland 76.0% 75.6% 71.0% 4.7% 4.9% 7.6% 20.1% 20.3% 23.1% 
Local Authority Area          
Aberdeen City 79.1% 79.4% 78.1% 3.7% 3.6% 4.8% 17.3% 17.6% 18.1% 
Aberdeenshire 82.6% 82.2% 80.4% 2.5% 2.6% 3.5% 15.6% 15.5% 16.5% 
Angus 79.1% 80.0% 73.0% 4.5% 4.6% 6.2% 16.2% 15.6% 22.1% 
Argyll & Bute 80.0% 77.6% 72.5% 4.0% 4.3% 6.0% 16.3% 18.4% 22.8% 
Clackmannanshire 69.4% 70.9% 74.5% 5.5% 5.4% 7.7% 25.3% 25.4% 21.9% 
Dumfries and Galloway 77.4% 76.2% 72.9% 4.2% 4.5% 5.9% 19.1% 19.5% 23.3% 
Dundee City 72.1% 71.5% 69.0% 6.6% 6.3% 9.2% 22.4% 23.9% 24.3% 
East Ayrshire 73.1% 74.6% 70.1% 6.3% 6.1% 9.3% 21.5% 20.4% 22.7% 
East Dunbartonshire 78.9% 77.6% 75.7% 3.1% 3.9% 6.0% 19.0% 18.7% 19.4% 
East Lothian 79.2% 77.9% 72.3% 3.5% 3.5% 6.7% 18.0% 19.4% 21.2% 
East Renfrewshire 77.2% 76.5% 70.8% 3.4% 3.6% 6.4% 19.1% 20.5% 22.5% 
Edinburgh, City of 77.4% 76.6% 69.7% 4.3% 4.5% 6.6% 19.5% 19.8% 25.5% 
Eilean Siar  79.4% 78.7% 66.6% 4.2% 4.6% 6.7% 17.7% 16.3% 29.2% 
Falkirk 78.1% 78.9% 73.4% 4.6% 4.4% 7.4% 18.5% 18.3% 20.8% 
Fife 75.9% 76.5% 71.9% 5.6% 5.8% 8.1% 18.8% 17.7% 21.3% 
Glasgow City 66.9% 66.6% 60.6% 6.8% 6.9% 11.5% 28.2% 28.8% 31.2% 
Highland 82.0% 81.7% 80.3% 3.2% 3.5% 4.6% 16.0% 16.3% 17.6% 
Inverclyde 68.4% 72.5% 71.2% 7.1% 6.4% 8.4% 24.8% 23.0% 22.7% 
Midlothian 80.7% 79.9% 74.9% 4.2% 4.2% 6.9% 15.1% 16.2% 19.4% 
Moray 80.4% 81.8% 78.8% 3.5% 3.8% 4.8% 17.2% 15.0% 17.9% 
North Ayrshire 71.5% 71.8% 63.2% 6.4% 7.4% 11.7% 23.5% 22.0% 27.6% 
North Lanarkshire 73.2% 71.0% 69.3% 5.4% 5.9% 10.0% 22.6% 23.8% 22.0% 
Orkney Islands 86.4% 83.9% 81.8% 2.7% 2.9% 3.1% 11.2% 14.2% 15.9% 
Perth and Kinross 78.1% 78.7% 72.5% 3.5% 3.7% 5.3% 18.8% 17.9% 22.5% 
Renfrewshire 75.0% 76.0% 69.7% 5.1% 5.5% 9.0% 20.9% 18.9% 22.7% 
Scottish Borders 81.4% 80.6% 71.0% 3.1% 3.6% 5.9% 16.2% 15.8% 23.9% 
Shetland Islands 88.1% 88.0% 86.3% 2.6% 2.8% 3.5% 10.4% 10.8% 10.3% 
South Ayrshire 77.2% 75.4% 68.1% 5.0% 5.4% 8.6% 18.9% 20.5% 24.4% 
South Lanarkshire 78.9% 76.7% 72.2% 4.2% 4.4% 7.8% 18.5% 20.6% 22.0% 
Stirling 76.8% 75.2% 69.8% 3.9% 4.5% 7.2% 19.2% 20.2% 24.1% 
West Dunbartonshire 73.9% 71.2% 67.1% 6.3% 6.9% 10.2% 20.8% 23.3% 25.1% 
West Lothian 77.8% 79.1% 72.2% 4.8% 4.6% 7.5% 17.7% 17.4% 23.0% 
 
Source:   2007 and 2008 data from Annual Population Survey (Jan to Dec)  
                Oct 2009/September 2010 data from Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland  and UK, June 2011 (Source Annual  
 Population  survey, Job Centre Plus administrative system and Annual Business Inquiry) 
Notes:  See sources for definitions and original sources  
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Labour Market Statistics [First Release] June 2011 figures 
and measures the number of claimants on the second 
Thursday of each month). The latest unemployment data at 
the Scottish constituency level is available in a SPICe 
Briefing.  
 
Statistics from the Annual Population Survey (2009) provide 
some indications of the impact of the recession at local area 
levels, by occupation and by sector (the APS combines 
results from the Labour Force Survey and the Scottish 
Labour Force Survey. Thus these figures differ slightly from 
those produced from the Labour Force Survey and the 
Annual Business Inquiry and from those published in  
Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, 
June 2011). Table 3 indicates the continuing significant 
differences in employment, unemployment and inactivity 
rates before the onset of the recession, however, between 
2008 and 2009 the gap between the areas with the highest 
and lowest employment rates widened by 5.8 percentage 
points. In the year October 2009 – September 2010 
employment rates varied from over 80% in Aberdeenshire, 
Orkney and Shetland to under 70% in nine local authority 
areas. Likewise unemployment rates were again lowest in 
Aberdeenshire, Orkney and Shetland and highest, over 
11%, in Glasgow and North Ayrshire, and inactivity rates 
were highest in Eilean Star and Glasgow City. 
 
 
Table 4:  Total workforce jobs* by industry, Scotland, June 2005–2010 and March 2011 (thousands) 
 
Industry June 2005 
June 
2006 
June 
2007 
June 
2008 
June 
2009 
June 
2010 
March 
2011 
A : Agriculture, forestry and fishing 51 54 60 60 59 62 57 
B : Mining and quarrying 25 28 30 30 29 27 29 
C : Manufacturing 233 226 228 212 201 181 163 
D : Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 10 10 13 16 19 19 19 
E : Water supply; sewerage, waste management etc 16 18 17 16 14 14 14 
F : Construction 181 194 203 199 185 188 183 
G : Wholesale & retail trade; repair of motor vehicles etc 382 384 380 396 398 363 394 
H : Transportation and storage 125 118 123 123 111 140 129 
I : Accommodation and food service activities 189 190 188 191 186 197 185 
J : Information and communication 72 73 79 69 68 75 69 
K : Financial and insurance activities 114 107 91 98 100 95 106 
L : Real estate activities 25 29 30 32 32 23 28 
M : Professional, scientific and technical activities 145 154 161 176 174 157 180 
N : Administrative and support service activities 174 180 192 200 185 176 185 
O : Public administration & defence; social security 180 177 181 177 146 145 140 
P : Education 199 200 192 208 208 197 212 
Q : Human health and social work activities 384 399 383 398 401 375 427 
R : Arts, entertainment and recreation 75 81 75 84 71 72 67 
S : Other service activities 63 65 63 58 59 67 63 
Column Total 2,644 2,685 2,690 2,740 2,651 2,571 2,651 
 
Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland, June 2011  
 *    Workforce jobs are a measure of jobs rather than people 
Note: There have been considerable revisions to the June 2009 and June 2010 from previous figures 
 
 
The most recent figures for the number of workforce jobs by 
industrial activity are detailed in Table 4. Total workforce job 
figures are a measure of jobs rather than people. Total 
seasonally adjusted employee jobs for the quarter ending 
March 2011 (the latest available figures) stood at 2,651 
thousand, up 108 thousand on the year and 42 thousand on 
the quarter. Table 4, although it is necessary to note some 
revisions to the 2009 and 2010 figures since the last report, 
provides some indication of both the impact of the recession 
and the recovery on sectors. Services jobs continue to 
increase faster than production jobs. Of the increase of 108 
thousand in total workforce jobs over the year to March  
 
2011 total services jobs rose by 118 thousand (5.7%). The 
construction industry continues to voice concerns at official 
figures, and the rise in 19 thousand construction jobs over 
the past year would seem to add to these concerns. Of 
more significance is the decline in manufacturing jobs, down 
22 thousand over the year (11.9%), especially given views 
that manufacturing is expected to play a significant part in 
the recovery and is expected to be more important given 
policies to ‘rebalance’ the economy.   The increase in the 
number of jobs over the past year in Education, Human 
health and social work activities – contributing 59 thousand 
jobs over the past year, or some 50% of the increase in 
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workforce jobs - would appear to be potentially temporary, 
given the planned cuts in the public sector.  
A continuing feature of the past two years has been the 
increase in the numbers of part time workers in Scotland, 
the latest data (to September 2010), indicates that over the 
past year the numbers of full time workers in Scotland 
declined by 57 thousand (-3.1%) whereas the numbers of 
part time workers rose by 19 thousand (2.9%). Over the two 
years Oct 2007 – Sept 2008 and Oct 2009 – Sept 2010 the 
number of full time workers has fallen by 118 thousand but 
the number of part time workers has increased by 32 
thousand and temporary workers by 7 thousand. The 
majority of those working part time choose to do so, 
however over the year to September 2010 the numbers 
reporting working part time because they could not find a full 
time job rose by 18 thousand, whereas the numbers of 
those who did not want a full time job remained unchanged, 
suggesting that increasing numbers of workers were taking 
part time employment in the absence of full time work (the 
same argument applies to temporary work. 
Table 5 of the Labour Market statistics (first release) 
provides information of the claimant count. The figure for 
May indicates a total number of all claimants of 140.1 
thousand, up 4.6 thousand for the year, but the lowest 
monthly figure for 2011. Of interest are the differing trends in 
the claimant count for men and women. The claimant count 
for men, 97.9 thousand was down 2.1 thousand over the 
year, whereas the comparable figure for women, 42.2 
thousand, was 6.6 thousand higher than a year ago. 
 
Table 5 provides some limited indications of the experience 
of unemployment in terms of claimant count by age and 
duration. The latest figures suggest that 20.3 thousand have 
been claiming benefits for more than a year, down 500 over 
the year and 4.9 thousand have been claiming for more than 
2 years, up 1.5 thousand over the year. 
 
Public Sector employment in Scotland 
As we noted in previous Commentaries there has been 
much evidence to suggest that most Scottish public sector 
organisations have been planning considerable budget 
reductions in recent months, given that staff costs account 
for around 52% or £18.8 billion of Scottish public spending 
(Audit Scotland). Audit Scotland noted ‘the Scottish public 
sector is facing the biggest squeeze on budgets since 
devolution’ (2009:8). 
 
 
Table 5:  Total claimant count and computerised claims by age and duration (Numbers and percentage 
change over year to May 2011) 
 
 All computerised 
claims 
All computerised 
claims Up to 6 
months 
All computerised 
claims Over 6 and 
up to 12 months  
All computerised 
claims All over 12 
months 
All 16+ numbers 139,000 88,000 29,900 20,300 
All 16+ % change over year 3.4% 5.2 1.4 -2.6 
All 18 – 24  over year 39,100 30,200 7,400 1,500 
All 25- 49  over year 77,400 45,500 12,600 14,200 
All 50 and above over year 21,400 12,000 4,800 4,600 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 indicates the changing pattern of public sector 
public sector employment (headcount) for 2010; total public 
sector employment has declined by 18,000 (2.9%) to 
595,800 by the end of 2010 and now represents 24% 
(22.4% if Public Sector Financial Institutions are excluded) 
of employment. Total employment in the devolved public 
sector has decreased by 2.7% over the year. This has been 
mainly driven by a decrease in local government 
employment.  Over the same period employment in the 
reserved public sector in Scotland has decreased by 4.5% 
over the year. In contrast employment in Public Sector 
Financial Institutions has increased by 1,700 (4.6%). Table 
7 indicates the changes in headcount by local authority.  
 
Table 7 sets out the changing levels of Local Authority 
employment for 2010 (data for Q1 2011 will not be 
published until 28 June) and indicates a decline in Local 
Authority employment of 9,100 over the year. 
Outlook  
The trends in employment have improved in 2011, 
nevertheless in the year to April 2011 the total number in 
employment fell by 7,000 and unemployment fell by 10,000 
to 207,000 and the numbers economically inactive fell by 
12,000.  The pattern of employment continues to change 
with rising numbers of part time (up 19,000 in the year to 
September 2010), temporary employees (remaining level 
over the same period) and declining numbers of full-time 
workers (down 57,000 in the year to September 2010). Over 
the same period the numbers of part time workers who 
could not find a full time job rose by 18,000. Rising trends in 
employment in 2011mask concerns not only as to the shift 
towards part time employment, but equally the shift away 
from production and reliance on the service sector. 
 
Changes to the public sector employment landscape will 
continue to be the main feature in 2011 with many sectors 
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Table 6: Total public sector employment in Scotland (headcount) 2010 
 
Broad category Area Q1 2010 Q2 2010 Q3 2010 Q4 2010 
Civil Service Scottish Govt Depts. 5700 5700 5600 5400 
 Crown Office 1900 1800 1800 1700 
 Scottish Govt Agencies 8300 6800 6900 6500 
 Non ministerial Depts. 1800 3400 3400 3100 
    
 
 
Local Government Teachers 62700 61100 na na 
 Other education 51600 51000 na na 
 Social work 54700 54000 na na 
 Police & Related services 24900 24800 24700 23600 
 Fire & related services 5800 5700 5700 5500 
 Other  104700 105200 na na 
    
 
 
Total Local Government  304300 301900 297800 295200 
    
 
 
NHS  163000 162200 161300 160700 
    
 
 
Public Corporations  4600 4600 4600 4400 
    
 
 
Other public bodies  16100 15400 15400 15000 
    
 
 
Total devolved sector  506000 502200 496600 493100 
    
 
 
Armed forces  12100 12200 12300 12300 
    
 
 
Civil Service Min of Defence 5900 5900 5800 5700 
 HM Revenue & Customs 10000 9800 9700 9600 
 DWP 12200 12000 11600 11300 
 Dept for International Dev. 500 500 500 500 
 Scotland Office 70 70 70 70 
 Other Civil service 3900 3900 3900 3800 
     
 
Civil service  34300 35500 34800 31000 
     
 
Public corporations  4600 4600 4500 4200 
     
 
Public bodies  15400 15400 15400 13900 
     
 
Public sector financial  36300 36700 36700 38500 
     
 
Total reserved sector  104300 104300 103800 95600 
     
 
Total Scottish 
employment  610200 606400 600400 
 
595800 
 
 
Source:  Quarterly Public Sector Employment series, Scottish Government. 
Note:  Figures may not total due to rounding. 
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Table 7 Local Government employment by local authority (headcount) 2010 (Not seasonally adjusted) 
 
Local Authority/Joint Board 
Q1 2010 
Totall all staff 
Q2 2010 
Total all staff 
Q3 2010 
Total all staff 
Q4 2010 
Total all staff 
Aberdeen City 9,500 9,400 8,900 8,800 
Aberdeenshire 15,000 14,900 14,500 14,400 
Angus 5,700 5,600 5,600 5,500 
Argyll & Bute 5,300 5,200 5,200 5,300 
Clackmannanshire 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,700 
Dumfries & Galloway 8,300 8,300 8,200 8,300 
Dundee City 8,200 8,100 8,000 7,900 
East Ayrshire 6,700 6,600 6,600 6,600 
East Dunbartonshire 5,000 5,000 4,900 4,800 
East Lothian 4,900 4,800 4,800 4,700 
East Renfrewshire 4,700 4,500 4,600 4,500 
Edinburgh, City of 19,100 18,800 18,500 18,500 
Eilean Siar 2,600 2,500 2,500 2,500 
Falkirk 8,000 7,800 7,900 7,900 
Fife 23,200 23,100 22,400 22,300 
Glasgow City 23,500 23,100 22,300 22,100 
Highland 12,900 13,000 12,700 12,600 
Inverclyde 4,700 4,700 4,600 4,600 
Midlothian 4,800 4,800 4,800 4,600 
Moray 5,100 5,100 5,100 5,000 
North Ayrshire 7,200 7,200 7,100 7,000 
North Lanarkshire 17,700 17,500 17,200 16,700 
Orkney Islands 2,800 2,400 2,400 2,400 
Perth & Kinross 6,200 6,100 6,000 6,000 
Renfrewshire 8,600 8,400 8,300 8,400 
Scottish Borders 5,700 5,700 5,700 5,700 
Shetland Islands 4,100 4,100 4,100 4,100 
South Ayrshire 5,500 5,600 5,600 5,800 
South Lanarkshire 15,500 15,800 15,500 14,800 
Stirling 4,500 4,400 4,500 4,400 
West Dunbartonshire 6,700 6,300 6,200 6,100 
West Lothian 8,500 8,500 8,400 8,300 
Total Fire Joint Boards 5,800 5,700 5,700 5,600 
Total Police Joint Boards 24,900 24,800 24,700 24,500 
Total Valuation Joint Boards 600 600 600 600 
Total Regional Transport (SPT)  700 700 600 
SCOTLAND 304,300 301,900 297,800 295,200 
 
 
Source:  Joint Staffing Watch Survey, Scottish Government 
Notes: 
1. Figures are rounded to nearest hundred. 
2. Totals may not add to the sum of the parts due to rounding. 
3. Figures for Fire Service staff exclude volunteer and retained fire-fighters. 
4. Police and Fire Service staffs in Dumfries and Galloway and Fife, who are not covered by Joint Boards, are included within the figures 
for Joint Boards for consistency. 
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seeking to reduce staff numbers and with increasing calls 
for industrial action by trade unions. Already in some 
quarters there have been calls for further legislation to limit 
the right to industrial action.   
 
Unite Scotland, in a paper entitled ‘Making Devolution Work’ 
(April 2011) argues the case for the introduction of 
mechanisms in Scotland to determine wages and related 
issues at a sectoral level, arguing that evidence from 
Europe supports the view that centralised collective 
bargaining leads to lower wage inequality. Equally, there 
much is to suggest that the European systems of employee 
participation have contributed to higher levels of economic 
growth. Unite argues for the extension of the principle 
operating in Agriculture (The Scottish Agricultural Wages 
Board) to other sectors and to act as a vehicle to ‘discuss  
wages, industry terms and conditions, investment, skills, 
apprenticeships and productivity levels’ (Unite Scotland, 
2011 pages 16-18). There is much to commend a reasoned 
debate as to such principles and to ask the question. What 
system and structures of employee relations would be best 
suited to Scotland, whether to continue to follow the UK or 
to see a more participative structure which encourages 
dialogue and problem solving?  
____________________ 
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Assessing the 
financial impact of the 
Scotland Bill:  
problems of Scottish 
Government 
accounting 
 
 
Professor Arthur Midwinter, IPSAR, University of Edinburgh 
 
 
The Scotland Bill contains proposals based on the Calman 
Report 1to remedy the major financial weakness of the 1997 
devolution settlement – namely its limited tax-raising 
powers2
.   
(The new funding model will combine Block Grant 
with new tax revenues from a Scottish Income Tax, a 
Scottish Land Transaction Tax and a Scottish Landfill Tax.  
However, it has been heavily criticised by the Scottish 
Government for having a “long-term deflationary bias”3 . 
 
This is a strong attack on a model intended to maintain 
stability and promote accountability in devolution finance.  
The current approach is embedded in the UK fiscal 
framework, in which the UK Government has responsibility 
for the planning and control of the public finances, and 
resource allocation to UK Departments and Devolved 
Administrations.  The Scottish Budget therefore benefits 
from 
 
“an automatic macroeconomic stabilisation level and 
a public expenditure per capita substantially above 
the UK average”4
. 
 
The UK Budget process provides a high degree of stability.  
It operates through incremental change, in which the major 
part of the new budget is the existing baseline, and 
decisions are made around the margins of this budget base.  
In the case of the Scottish Budget, incremental adjustments 
are made through the Barnett Formula which delivers the 
same per capita increase/decrease as comparable UK 
programmes, and has delivered “stability and predictability” 
since devolution”5. 
 
Fiscal reform 
The Bill states that the new model will create a system 
which will allow the Scottish Parliament to determine how 
revenues are raised to supplement its existing responsibility 
to determine how budgets are spent, and be accountable for 
those choices.  It creates a degree of risk over revenue 
receipts, but will have borrowing powers to manage this flow 
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of resources  As the majority of funding will still be provided 
by a Block Grant, stability and predictability will be 
maintained.  These plans will operate within the UK fiscal 
framework which will allow the Treasury to retain aggregate 
control “consistent with the continuing reservation of overall 
macroeconomic policy”6. 
 
So the Scottish Budget will now have two revenue streams, 
from its “own revenues” and from a smaller Block Grant, 
calculated as at present, but reduced by the amount of 
anticipated revenues. 
 
Initially, the tax revenues will be forecast and assigned to 
the Scottish Budget in a transparent way to show how much 
grant is being replaced by taxation, based on the current 
levels generated by 10p tax rate across all bands. 
 
The full system is planned to be implemented by 2016.  
Firstly, the minor taxes will be introduced in 2015, with the 
new revenue borrowing powers of £200 million per annum, 
up to a £500 million limit, to manage any deficits from 
revenue shortfall, whilst surpluses can be retained in a new 
Scottish cash reserve for offsetting any deficits in future 
years. 
 
In 2016, the main UK rates will be reduced by 10p for 
Scottish taxpayers, and the Scottish Parliament will set a 
replacement tax necessary to balance its Budget.  There will 
then be a permanent reduction of Block Grant.   
 
If there is an outturn deficit of less than 0.5%, the Parliament 
will be expected to absorb this in the Budget. Any borrowing 
can fund shortfalls for up to four years.  Any shortfalls or 
surpluses arising from forecasting errors will be dealt with by 
transfers between the Scottish Budget and the UK 
Consolidated Fund. 
 
 
The Scottish Government’s response 
In the Scottish Government’s view, the new model will 
“generate greater volatility in future budgets” and result in 
“UK cuts by the back door”, as they expect tax receipts to 
grow more slowly than the Block Grant, thereby reducing 
the Scottish Budget.  Therefore 
 
“we estimate that these proposals would have cost 
Scotland £8 billion since 1999”7.  
 
Secondly, they claim it leaves Scotland exposed to the 
impact of changes to UK tax policy even though a detriment 
provision will prevent any loss of resources, which has been 
a key principle of devolution since 1999. 
 
Thirdly, it regards the revenue borrowing powers as 
insufficient to manage revenue volatility.  Overall, it sees the 
proposals as a “backward step” which “could make the 
spending and economic challenges Scotland faces more 
difficult”.  
 
This is a contentious interpretation of the financial impact of 
the Bill.  The cumulative shortfall of £8 billion exaggerates 
the financial impact of the new system on the Budget.  This 
Government uses this practice regularly in presenting 
spending plans and efficiency savings, or in forecasting 
future allocations. 
 
More importantly, it is inappropriate when seeking to assess 
the financial impact of the new tax powers on the Scottish 
Budget.  What matters is the stability of annual budgets and 
the capacity of the borrowing powers to cope with any 
volatility in the revenue stream. 
 
The Scottish Government’s estimate of the additive shortfall 
since devolution is £1.2 billion, or £109 million per annum on 
average.  However, specific years can exceed this average 
and could be a concern.  Fortunately, the Scottish 
Government’s revenue estimates are significantly lower than 
the official estimates from HMRC. 
 
The Finance Minister advised the Scottish Parliament 
(Official Report, 14/1/2011, col.157) that his Government’s 
position had been strongly influenced by an academic paper 
by Professors Hughes-Hallet and Scott.  This paper reports 
broadly similar conclusions, and the academics have since 
gone on record in The Scotsman of 14th January 2011 as 
supporting the Scottish Government’s position, and that 
their cumulative shortfall assessment figures which they see 
as economically damaging (and indeed also use the term 
“deflationary bias”), is based on Scottish Government data8. 
 
The Scottish Government’s estimate of the yield from a 10p 
tax rate is that on average, it is 15% of the Departmental 
Expenditure Limit.  This is based on data in Government 
Expenditure and Revenues in Scotland, but GERS only 
provides an estimate of total yield.  Their note does not 
illustrate how the 15% figure was reached, and also 
excludes revenues from the other taxes. 
 
The official estimates, provided by HMRC, are much higher, 
at 17.25% over the same period, with a range from 14.6% to 
20.2%.  Table 1 compares the annual estimates of the 
Scottish Government with the official statistics on which the 
reforms will be based, and shows the official estimates are 
consistently higher, and add to a total of around £1 billion 
more than the Scottish Government’s estimates between 
1999 and 2007.  This would result in a modest total shortfall 
of around £200 million, not £1.2 billion. 
 
This suggests that the volatility will be much less than the 
Scottish Government assumed, but the range of scores from 
14.6% to 20.2% is wide enough to create concerns over the 
degree of volatility in revenues and the intention to use an 
average figure for the permanent adjustment to the Block 
Grant. 
 
This could be overcome, however, by continuing the 
practice of forecasting and assigning the tax revenues to the 
Scottish Budget as intended during the transition.  The UK 
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Government objective is to increase the Parliament’s 
financial powers and to link the Scottish Budget more 
closely to Scottish tax revenues.  It is not its purpose to 
change Scotland’s share of UK funding, but to increase 
choice at the margins. With two funding streams, however, 
there could be changes to the Budget, compared with the 
Barnett model, in any year.  Now the changes will depend 
on the tax decisions of the Parliament and the performance 
of the economy. 
 
The Bill acknowledges that the new tax powers give the 
Parliament “an interest in the economy” (i.e. to increase its 
tax yield).  In the Scottish Parliament, the major division was 
over the lack of economic levers to influence growth.  The 
Bill Committee’s report9 reflects the conflicting evidence 
over the causal link between fiscal devolution and economic 
growth.  The report quotes several economic experts 
expressing scepticism over the Scottish Government’s 
economic arguments.  These included views that economic 
growth is driven mainly by factors other than taxes and 
spending, and that the fiscal powers should lead to better 
governance, which might lead to improved growth later. 
 
This is a combination of empirical and theoretical 
arguments.  The evidence on fiscal causality has been 
examined extensively, but “better governance” is a slippery 
concept.  The Committee draws on this substantive body of 
evidence to reject the case made by Scottish Minister’s for 
full fiscal autonomy, on the grounds that “the overwhelming 
balance of expert opinion” did not find any causal link 
between fiscal devolution and growth (paragraph 36). 
 
The Committee then appears to adopt a contradictory 
position over the grant reduction mechanism in that “it 
should not insulate the Scottish Budget from the 
performance of the Scottish economy, so that the Scottish 
Parliament has a direct financial stake in Scotland’s 
economic success!” (paragraph 74). 
 
Politicians may be unwilling to publicly acknowledge their 
inability to influence economic growth under the devolution 
settlement.  It is certainly the case that growth was heavily 
influenced by the growth of public spending between 1999 
and 200510, but that simply reflects UK budgetary strategy. 
 
The problem remains that the new model could result in a 
smaller Budget even if the Scottish Parliament simply 
maintained tax revenues as they are at present.  This would 
blur the clear lines of accountability for tax decisions. 
 
Implementation can be achieved without the need for a 
permanent adjustment to the Block Grant, thus maintaining 
stability.  For the initial period, the intention is to deduct 
forecast revenues from the Block Grant total to provide a 
required level of grant, adjusted for any variation in tax 
levels, the tax revenues will then be assigned to the Scottish 
Budget. 
 
This model could simply continue, removing the need for a 
permanent adjustment of the Block Grant based on average 
revenues as a proportion of the DEL.  This would also 
remove the need for borrowing powers, the Block Grant will 
continue to be set by Barnett, minus the forecast revenues, 
and there would be no shortfall/surpluses on the Budget 
because of volatility in revenues. 
 
Put more simply, the Scottish Budget would continue to 
have a full Barnett-based spending assessment, funded by 
assigned tax revenues and a reduced Block Grant.  This 
would remove the volatility problem, and maintain our 
relative position in UK allocations, and only vary when tax 
decisions are taken to do so.  
 
This approach would better meet the UK Government’s 
objective “to ensure that the relative levels of public 
expenditure remain constant”11.  The Scottish Budget’s 
share of UK funding would remain stable, with any budget 
variations reflected in higher or lower taxes on Scottish 
taxpayers. 
 
Conclusions 
The Scotland Bill will increase the financial accountability of 
the Scottish Parliament by requiring tax levels to be set 
annually to balance the Scottish Budget, and to vary the 
Budget according to its political preferences by increasing or 
decreasing spending and taxation at the margins.  The 
Scottish Budget will remain within the UK fiscal framework. 
 
Whilst the new funding mechanism will create a degree of 
volatility in tax revenues, this will not result in the 
deflationary bias as suggested by the Scottish Government.  
Their estimating errors and practice of cumulative 
accounting greatly exaggerate the financial impact of the Bill 
on the Scottish Budget. 
 
The degree of volatility is much less, and can be dealt with 
within the UK fiscal framework by maintaining the practice of 
forecasting and assigning revenues to the Scottish Budget, 
whilst reducing the Block Grant accordingly from the 
conventional Barnett spending assessment.  This would 
remove the need for a permanent adjustment to the Block 
Grant, and for revenue borrowing powers.  This would meet 
the Calman principles of autonomy, accountability and 
equity within the principles of the Union and Treasury 
management of the public finances. 
 
This would operate in the same way as the grant system in 
local government.  Barnett would continue to determine 
Scotland’s appropriate share of the UK Budget.  That figure 
would then be adjusted to reflect the tax yield set in 
Edinburgh.  A reduction from 10p would reduce the 
allocation, whilst an increase above 10p would increase 
spending. 
 
The Scottish tax decision would determine the total budget 
available, whilst Barnett would retain our relative position 
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and provide funding stability.  Accountability would therefore 
be increased and the constitutional objectives met. 
 
 
Table 1: Comparative estimates of 10p tax 
yield in Scotland Bill 
 
 
Year 
Scottish 
Government 
£million 
 
HMRC 
£million 
 
1999-2000 
 
2651 
 
2600 
2000-1 2898 2980 
2001-2 3018 3130 
2002-3 3098 3210 
2003-4 3207 3310 
2004-5 3427 3510 
2005-6 3746 3930 
2006-7 4073 4260 
2007-8 4394 4570 
 
Total 30572 31560 
  
 
____________________ 
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The governance of 
Scottish ferry services 
 
 
Professor Neil Kay, Department of Economics 
 
1.  Introduction 
 In this paper we argue that the present arrangements for 
review and implementation of Scottish Ferry policy are not 
competent and that, in particular the role and functions of 
Transport Scotland should be replaced by an independent 
regulator supported and directed by a sector-specific 
statutory framework.  The arguments here are buttressed by 
reference to serious and well-documented failures on the 
part of this agency and its predecessor government 
department in dealing with the areas of ferry governance 
with which they have been given responsibility.          
 
By “not competent” it is not intended to imply failures in 
terms of competence or performance on the part of any 
individual. Competence depends on context, training and 
perspective, the problems here are systemic and 
institutional and cannot be sorted by any review or reviews 
carried out by Transport Scotland itself.  The former Home 
Secretary John Reid once famously remarked that his 
Immigration Department was “not fit for purpose”.  What can 
be said about the present role and functions of Transport 
Scotland in the context of Scottish ferry policy is that they 
were not designed for purpose.   
 
This paper is intended to be read in conjunction with my 
2009 Fraser Commentary paper on Scottish ferry policy1 for 
which it can be treated as both an extension and update2.  It 
can however be read independently of that paper, though 
for reason of brevity and economy we shall avoid much of 
the technical and legislative detail covered in that earlier 
paper where possible.      
 
2.  The 2009 Fraser Ferry Policy Paper and 
update 
In the 2009 paper I concluded that “It is difficult to overstate 
both the scale of the failures in policy making with respect to 
Scottish ferries post-devolution, nor how unnecessary such 
failures have been”.  
 
Nothing that has happened since has done anything to 
moderate these views and indeed if anything, matters have 
worsened, the 2009 paper argued (as I and others had done 
since 2001) that whatever governance solutions were 
adopted as policy for Scottish ferry services that these 
should have as minimum specifications an independent 
regulator supported by a dedicated statutory regulatory 
framework and clearly specified operator of last resort, as 
tends to be standard as part of oversight provision for other 
UK essential public services.   
 
None of these are in place though the Scottish Government 
has recently announced that it will explore the possibility of 
an industry regulator backed by statutory legislation, this is 
discussed further below.  
 
However, the major problems that I identified in that paper 
still hold and in addition to the failures to put in place the 
regulatory safeguards that the network needs, there is still 
little evidence that there is proper recognition and 
understanding at official level of the opportunities and 
constraints represented by EU law in this context, in 
particular the roles played by public service obligations 
(PSOs), public service contracts (PSCs) and the Altmark 
principles.   In turn, there is failure to fully appreciate and 
explore issues associated with exclusivity provisions and 
methods for dealing with cherry picking,  all of which is 
provided for in EU law and associated guidelines.   
 
The major changes since 2009 relate to the first of the three 
major public service contracts that are set to be decided 
between now and 2013. The case is that of Gourock-
Dunoon3
 and the outcome is frankly a shambles and 
disastrous for the public interest as it affects the taxpayer, 
the users, and the dependent communities.      
 
In 2007 the Scottish Government had come to power 
promising to build two vehicle-passenger ferries for the 
Gourock-Dunoon public service route, and indeed 
throughout the tender process it had been the Government’s 
claim that they had been working towards a “town centre to 
town centre vehicle and passenger ferry service between 
Gourock and Dunoon4. The Government was aware that 
studies, including those sponsored by the Scottish 
Executive, confirmed the economic case for building these 
vessels5 and also confirmed that they would have to be built 
specially since suitable vessels would be unlikely to be 
obtained through the second hand market6.  They would 
have been aware there was no legal impediment to building 
and deploying these vessels7 as long as suitable accounting 
measures were put in place to make sure there was no 
leakage of subsidy from the foot passenger side to the 
vehicle-carrying side, as the European Commission had 
confirmed in an answer in 2007.  There was no change to 
EU law or guidelines relating to the issues that would have 
made a substantive difference to these issues over the 
period 2007-2011.  
 
What actually happened was a series of prevarications and 
confusions that at the very least demonstrated the kind of 
systemic failures of governance that I had argued in 2009 
showed the need for major institutional reform in this area. 
First, the Government claimed that EU law prevented them 
from building new ferries for the route8.  This was not true 
and never has been true, even the most charitable 
interpretation is that it displays complete misunderstanding 
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of EU law as it applies. Second, the Herald newspaper 
recently revealed that the Government made a covert offer 
to the private operator Western Ferries in 2007 that the 
Government would withdraw the CalMac vehicle-carrying 
public service if Western would run some of their vehicle-
carrying service into Dunoon Pier.  This would have reduced 
the potential market for (profitable) vehicle-carrying on the 
public service town centre route, increased the need for 
subsidy on the public service route, and increase the 
probability that the only option left for bidders for the route 
would be a passenger-only option.9  Third, the Government 
claimed that a survey they had sponsored showed that 
suitable vehicle-carrying ferries were available on the 
second-hand market for Gourock-Dunoon (and by 
implication precluding the need to build them). Freedom of 
Information requests showed that this was not true.10       
 
There were other prevarications such as FoI-refuted claims 
by the Government that they were in active discussions with 
the European Commission11 and attempts to persuade the 
European Commission to extend the deadline for the new 
tender on what could only have been spurious grounds.12  In 
the end the winning tender for the town centre public service 
route was announced just after the May 5th Holyrood 
election, and as was widely expected was a passenger only 
option.  At a stroke this will degrade the options open to 
users on the town centre route, heavily increase subsidy 
unnecessarily compared to what would have been needed if 
the modern vehicle-passenger ferries needed for the route 
had been built and made available for the tender, create a 
vehicle-carrying private unregulated monopoly over a 
strategically important transport route, and impact heavily 
and adversely on dependent local economies and 
communities.  
 
However that is only one part of the Scottish ferry network, 
what is happening on Gourock-Dunoon is set to be a model 
that could destabilize much of the Scottish ferry network and 
fragile dependent communities.  That is only one part of the 
risks and threats to the public interest that failures at 
governance and policy level are creating here.     
 
3.  How we got here  
Domestic ferry services in most countries are treated as 
essential services and administered appropriately. On a 
straight mile-for-mile basis ferry travel can be one of the 
most expensive forms of transport modes and where ferries 
are used it is typically because there are few, if any, 
practical options.  They tend to have natural monopoly 
characteristics and often high levels of externalities with 
respect to local regional economic development. For those 
reasons, most countries subject their domestic ferry 
services to careful and systemic control, either through state 
ownership or regulatory oversight. 
 
Nationalization was the standard UK solution to an industry 
with these economic characteristics until Margret Thatcher’s 
privatisation programme in the Eighties replaced state 
control with regulatory oversight in most of these cases.  
The pattern was fairly standard; a nationalised industry 
would be replaced by a competitive tendering resulting in a 
series of privately-owned companies with an independent 
regulator and a sector-specific statutory framework.  Each 
case incorporated necessary checks and balances such as 
provision for an operator of last resort should any incumbent 
operator default or otherwise threaten breaches of its 
contract.  
 
With post-war domestic Scottish ferry services being 
dominated by one large nationalized ferry operator 
Caledonian Macbrayne, this fitted into the first part of the 
story of how such natural monopolies came to be 
administered in the UK.  Where the story parted company 
with the standard script in the Thatcher era of transformation 
through privatization and regulation was that Scottish ferry 
services remained for the most part in state-owned hands.        
 
In my 2009 paper on Scottish ferry policy in the Fraser 
Commentary, I covered some of the background to this 
anomaly which to a large extent revolved around the fact 
that while ferry services were an integral part of much of the 
Scottish transport network in the north and west of the 
country, this was simply not a major issue south of the 
border apart from the very localized case of the Isle of Wight 
ferries which were already run by private companies.  
 
A contributory problem here is that while air, rail, and road 
policy is highly visible to transport policy makers and 
commentators who may depend on (or at least observe) 
these services themselves, much of what happens on 
domestic Scottish ferry services tends to impact on 
peripheral, scattered and isolated communities. The debacle 
of the Edinburgh trams has received high levels of coverage 
in the Scottish media and there is high public awareness 
that there are major public interest issues at stake here - 
even if there is less awareness of exactly what the issues 
are.  However, there was far little coverage and public 
awareness of the fact that the first Northlink ferry contract 
serving the Northern Iles (Orkney and Shetland from 
Aberdeen) effectively collapsed with forced retendering in 
2004 after the operator receiving a multi-million pound bail 
out following its threats to withdraw from the route.  Yet 
these ferry services to the Northern Isles are essential 
public services with many communities and businesses in 
Orkney and Shetland dependent on them for their survival. 
And no matter what can be done to salvage the Edinburgh 
trams project it is highly unlikely that it will ever achieve the 
status of essential public service. 
 
Similarly, at the end of this month the CalMac Gourock-
Dunoon town centre to town centre vehicle-passenger 
service will end after several decades of operation and be 
replaced by a passenger-only service.  This leaves by 
default an unregulated private firm (Western Ferries) as 
monopoly operator of vehicle-carrying ferry services over 
the Clyde Estuary, the road option involving a detour of 84 
miles. While the traffic numbers on The Clyde Estuary are of 
course much smaller than across the Forth Estuary, in 
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transport terms this is comparable to giving a private firm 
the keys to the Forth Bridge with no direct control by 
government over pricing and other strategic decisions.  
 
A further problem is at the level of individual markets like 
Gourock-Dunoon, the scale of any possible market 
distortion is likely to fall below the radar of the OFT, even 
though they may have profound effects on local economies 
and communities.  However, in the aggregate the failures of 
successive governments to put in place a coherent (or 
indeed any) statutory framework for regulating Scottish ferry 
services means that the system is simply unable to deal 
competently and coherently with standard problems that 
regulators of other essential services face on a regular 
basis, such as monopoly pricing and delivery of services, 
market entry, cherry picking, exclusivity, public service 
obligations (PSOs) versus public service contracts  (PSCs) 
and operator of last resort.  
 
The problem with the governance of Scottish ferry service is 
that for the last decade it has been mis-specified as a 
problem by government.  It has been largely defined and 
seen as a transport sector where subsdised public services 
would now have to be made subject to competitive 
tendering to be made compliant with EU law. While this is 
correct as far as it goes, this has helped obscure the fact 
that the self-regulatory function that nationalisation had filled 
now left a regulatory gap that would have to be replaced for 
these essential services if matters were not to fall apart.  But 
the supposed urgency of the need to comply with EU 
regulations meant government since 2000 brushed aside 
such arguments arguing that matters were too urgent for 
such luxuries as proper regulatory oversight. In 2000, the 
Executive stated they were “aiming to have the first tender 
in place by Spring 2001 with implementation to follow”13 
 a 
time horizon which was never realistic as I and others 
pointed out14. In the event the first CalMac tender for Clyde 
and Hebrides ferry services began in October 2007, the 
imminent (though ever-receding) deadline for tendering 
effectively capping and neutering any chance of reasoned 
debate.       
 
In 2001 when the issue of need for an Independent 
Regulator of competitively tendered ferry services was 
raised by me and others to the then Scottish Executive and 
the Scottish Parliament, the response was that “The 
Transport Minister when questioned on (the subject of an 
Independent Regulator) continues to state that it is not 
needed since the Maritime and Coastguard Agency is 
responsible for safety15.   
 
While of course it is the Minister who is held responsible and 
accountable for not knowing that the term ‘independent 
regulator’ generally refers to an agency with an economic 
function.  Iit was such a briefing from officials which made it 
impossible to make headway on this issue with successive 
ministers, despite it being raised repeatedly by me and 
others to the Executive and Parliament, including in invited 
evidence to Inquiries into ferry tendering held in each of the 
first three sessions of the Scottish Parliament.   
 
4.  Where we are now  
Two statements by Scottish Cabinet Secretaries with 
respect to the Gourock-Dunoon tendering issue in recent 
weeks reinforce the above points.  First in response to the 
Gourock-Dunoon debacle, the Government news release 
quoted John Swinney, Cabinet Secretary for Finance and 
Sustainable Growth:    
 
“the Government is now examining the scope for 
introducing a statutory ferry regulator which could 
have strong powers to ensure there is no predatory 
commercial activity on any Scottish ferry route”16           
 
While it may be seen as something that, at least, there is at 
last official recognition of the need for a regulator with 
statutory powers here, albeit ten years late, the reasons 
given for it reflect further misunderstanding of the scale and 
nature of the economic problem here.  Predatory behaviour 
or predation in economics refers to anti-competitive 
behaviour such as pricing below cost to drive rivals out the 
market.  This was not an issue on Gourock-Dunoon where 
the market distortions were largely created by government 
intervention rather than corporate action, nor is it likely to be 
one of the major issues for a regulator in the markets under 
discussion here.  Indeed, the problems created and 
buttressed through government restrictions on the Gourock-
Dunoon on Gourock-Dunoon were the opposite of predation 
with the dominant position already achieved for the private 
sector operator allowing it to achieve operating margins 
averaging about 27% in recent years17.   
 
Just talking about creating a regulator without first having a 
clear sight of what, how, and who he is she is supposed to 
be regulating is rather like appointing an umpire without 
giving them a rule book. Even who they would regulate 
needs to be made clear – for example, does it include 
private unsubsidized firms plying routes that are classifiable 
as public service routes under EU law? Eleven years after 
the issues of competitive tendering of nationalised ferry 
services first appeared on the political map there is no 
evidence that such questions are appearing on the agenda, 
let alone being answered. 
 
The second statement regarding Gourock-Dunoon was by 
Alex Neil Cabinet Secretary for Infrastructure and Capital 
Investment to the Scottish Parliament June 2nd  2011  
 
Alex Neil: “The origin of the contract and tender 
was essentially the European Commission. The 
Scottish Government had no option other than to 
tender the service. We had to take decisions on 
the basis of the tenders that were returned, and 
we took the option that involved the absolute 
minimum number of redundancies. Had we taken 
any other option, the number of redundancies 
involved would have multiplied by four. I take it 
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that all members in the chamber will welcome the 
Government̏s policy of minimising redundancies 
in such situations”.18  
 
While some members and interested parties might indeed 
welcome a policy and decision under competitive tendering 
that was taken on the basis of minimising redundancies, 
such a policy raises serious questions under competitive 
tendering and extant law as it relates to these issues. It is 
perhaps a reflection of the low level of awareness of these 
issues that this point does not seem to have been picked up 
and subjected to further discussion and investigation, 
whether in or out of Parliament.       
 
At this point it should be noted there is a Ferries Review19 
which has been conducted over most of the life of the last 
Parliament and is publicised by the Government as intended 
to provide a basis for “a long-term plan for ferry services to 
2022”. This will not shed much light on the issues that 
matter here, indeed it has the potential to not just have 
wasted much public money but to make things even worse.    
 
The Review has been set up to heavily reflect the views of 
“stakeholders” which in the way it has been conducted more 
reflects commercial interests rather than those of the public 
and the communities seen to be served.  This is rather like 
inviting the foxes to participate in the design of the chicken 
coup.  By all means observe the reactions of creatures of a 
vulpine persuasion to your first efforts at a chicken coup and 
be prepared to modify your efforts in the light of these 
observations. But an effective chicken coup, just like an 
effective regulatory framework should first start with the 
experience of others who have faced similar problems, 
whether it is farmers in the case of stock protection or 
regulators in the case of essential public services. And the 
Summary20 of consultation questions asked in the Review 
confirms that the quality and content of answers received 
will unfortunately reflect the quality and content of questions 
asked (how is anyone supposed to phrase a meaningful 
reply to “Do you agree that the ferry service should be 
designed to meet the most important needs of the 
community?”).  
 
So where do we stand now in terms of Scottish Ferry 
Services?  We have a rag bag of pricing, investment, public 
procurement and public infrastructure policies that not only 
vary between contracts but sometimes even within contracts 
(such as the RET “trial” applied for several years so far to 
parts of the Clyde and Hebrides network but not others) . 
The Gourock-Dunoon contract has finished in a shambles, 
the Northlink tender is due for retendering in 2012 and there 
is no sign that the Government has learnt the lessons that 
matter from the previous fiasco that resulted in bail out and 
forced retendering here (my efforts to persuade the then 
Scottish Executive that this proved the need for an operator 
of last resort was rebuffed by officials). 
 
But then in 2013 comes the retendering of CalMac and the 
Clyde and Hebrides contract again. This, more than 
anything else, reflects the crossed fingers and head-in-the-
sand approach to these issues by government.  
 
There are two possible scenarios from the tendering of 
CalMac in the form of the Clyde and Hebrides contract 
every six years under EU law. The first depends on CalMac 
(holding company state-owned David MacBrayne) winning 
the contract in perpetuity every time it comes up for 
retendering.  In a level competitive playing field that is a bit 
like throwing a dice and betting on the same number coming 
up every time. It might happen, but then other parties might 
want to have a look at the dice, or at least question whether 
it is worthwhile tossing the dice at all.  But if the “CalMac in 
perpetuity” scenario does hold and goes unchallenged, the 
only major cost is the unnecessary waste down the years of 
millions of pounds of public and private money spent on 
retendering process and a time horizon for operators and 
policy makers dictated by the time of the next retender.  But 
if this scenario holds, then whatever it is, it is not competitive 
tendering and this would inevitably become clear to potential 
operators and the EC.  .  
 
The second and more dangerous scenario is that eventually 
CalMac loses its contract to another EU bidder. At this point, 
if there was a coherent regulatory framework in place as for 
other essential services then at least there is potential to 
guard against problems from moral hazard, adverse 
selection, opportunistic behaviour, technical or financial 
failure on the part of the incumbent operator. But obviously 
these safeguards would have to be in place before the 
tender process takes place, you do not start re-writing the 
rule book once the game has started and you are worried 
about who is winning, just as you do not start looking for an 
operator of last resort when you need then to start 
tomorrow.  
 
The dangers of such a scenario would be great enough 
even with a coherent regulatory framework in place with one 
single private operator dominating Scottish ferry services. 
Without such a framework there would be numerous 
potential threats to the public interest, most obviously from 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the new incumbent, 
as any experienced industry regulator would almost 
certainly advise. And with CalMac having been presumably 
been wound up since it had lost its contract and only 
business, there would be no obvious alternative open to the 
Scottish Government in the event of such problems.  Even if 
Northlink as another subsidiary of state-owned David 
Macbrayne was still available in principle, the scale and 
diversity of the CalMac network is at much greater levels 
than that faced by Northlink.  I simply do not know what 
would happen if a private operator that had won the Clyde 
and Hebrides contract from CalMac started acting 
opportunistically and threatened to withdraw unless the 
government paid up, but much more importantly it is fairly 
clear the government does not know either, or at least does 
not want to think about it.  The lesson from other regulated 
industries involving essential services is that the crossed 
fingers and head-in-the-sand approach does not work with 
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operators whose obligations are to their shareholders, you 
have to anticipate how the operators might exploit any 
loopholes or other forms of advantage and set up regulatory 
safeguards in advance, not deal with them from a blank 
page once they arise.                  
                              
Meanwhile, cherry picking and unrestricted market entry can 
proceed to undermine public service contracts quite 
unaffected by these contractual issues. Cherry picking has 
had varying degrees of success in different parts of the 
Scottish ferry network;  it is fewer routes, that have been 
and will be,  typically targeted for cherry picking.  More 
segments of routes such as vehicle carrying, short 
crossings, freight and livestock, with high season cherry 
picking also being a possibility but not yet really in evidence.  
Cherry picking in the context of Scottish ferry services can 
cream off the profitable segments of the joint product 
provided by vehicle/freight/passenger vessels, leaving any 
high cost (mostly crewing levels for safety reasons)  and low 
revenue loss-making  passenger-only public service to bear 
a higher level of subsidy if it is to be provided at all.  The 
dangers of cherry picking in ferry services are arguably 
greater than for most other essential services such as postal 
services since local natural monopoly characteristics reduce 
or more likely eliminate the chances of competition amongst 
cherry pickers. Also in general these tend not be 
contestable markets once entry has been achieved and 
incumbency established because of typically limited access 
to suitable vessels and/or infrastructure.     
 
The failure to realize these issues is reflected in the 
possibility raised in the current Ferries Review consultation    
 
“As a first step, we could test some routes by 
tendering them singly. This would encourage the 
commercial ferries market to provide services 
wherever possible leaving only the services 
which are unlikely to attract operations on a 
commercial basis (i.e. without subsidy) to be 
funded through the public purse”21.. 
 
But if there are any routes on the Scottish ferry network 
which could be profitable providing a full complement of 
user services, including what are usually loss-making 
services for foot passengers, a market entrant could 
potentially make even more profit by cherry picking the 
profitable segments of that market, such as vehicles.  There 
is no exclusivity provision at the moment to stop market 
entry outside existing or projected public service contracts 
(part of the reason for the Northlink tender collapse), which 
is also exactly what happened in the case of Gourock-
Dunoon.  Why should any firm tender for a public service 
contract when it can cherry pick the time, level and form of 
entry that suits it and simply crowd out any similar services 
that are offered by the public service operator?  Indeed just 
a few weeks before the Scottish Government’s Ferries 
Review was asking questions last year as to whether 
Ardrossan-Brodick was one of the routes that should be 
considered for single route tender22,  Western Ferries had 
announced their intention to enter into direct competition 
with CalMac on Ardrossan-Brodick using a similar market 
entry strategy to that employed in Gourock-Dunoon; “we are 
looking to take to Arran those elements of that model which 
have allowed Western Ferries to run a commercially 
successful service against a heavily subsidised service 
provided by CalMac.”23   
 
If anything could be taken to epitomize Government’s 
current ferry policy it is the contrast between the unreality of 
what they think could happen here and the reality of what 
the market was and is actually planning.  This was visible to 
see for anyone who picked up a national newspaper, and 
not just in 2010; Western Ferries also has had a long-
standing and publicly expressed interest in entering the Bute 
market using a similar business model to Gourock-Dunoon.    
 
5.  What should be done? 
 
The model (if it can be described as such) for governance of 
the Scottish ferry network is simply unsustainable. Either 
faith is placed in the likes of CalMac winning its retender 
indefinitely (an expensive and highly improbable outcome 
with competitive tendering and assuming a level playing 
field), or we face the unacceptable dangers of the major part 
of the Scottish ferry network and the associated essential 
public services being eventually captured by a commercial 
interest that is not subject to the normal checks and 
constraints that are standard practice in other essential 
public services in the UK. Further, even in the absence of 
the worst case of capture by a poorly regulated commercial 
interest, the network as a whole faces progressive 
disintegration and erosion though unrestricted and 
unregulated cherry picking   It is not as if government has 
been unaware of the dangers of cherry picking, there has 
been public discussion of the dangers by the Scottish 
Executive and the Scottish Parliament since 2001. But it has 
proven difficult or impossible to convince policymakers that 
focusing only on routes does not get to the roots of what 
cherry picking will target.  Just as in postal services they will 
seek low cost or high value services of individual routes and 
be willing, indeed delighted, to leave the high cost and low 
value segments of any route for a public service and the tax 
payer to pick up.         
 
The problem is that there is absolutely no evidence that any 
of this is on the Scottish Government’s radar.  There is a 
debate to be had, and reasoned arguments on both sides, 
as to whether most of the Scottish ferry network should be 
run by a single state-owned holding company or whether 
most of it should be in private hands, much of it awarded 
through public service contracts.  There is also a debate to 
be had, and reasoned arguments on both sides, as to 
whether or not some routes should be tendered separately 
rather than as part of the main CalMac bundle, effectively to 
institutionalize cherry picking and bring in a degree of 
oversight by government. Indeed these very debates were 
encouraged in the current Scottish Ferries Review.  The 
problem is that the debates are irrelevant, a waste of time 
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and even counterproductive since they are not predicated 
on a real understanding of commercial logic and interests, 
let alone what EU law permits and prohibits in this context. 
In the absence of coherent oversight the market will provide 
its own solutions and one of the first lessons students learn 
in Economics 101 is that you cannot just rely on crossed 
fingers to ensure that private interest aligns with the public 
interest.         
 
While the present outcomes for ferry services in Scotland 
are not sustainable, there are alternatives which are, and 
these include alternatives already put before the Scottish 
Executive and the Scottish Parliament.  One example was in 
fact the default option which had been the outcome of 
discussions between the Scottish Executive and the 
European Commission in 2000 and included splitting the 
CalMac Clyde and Hebrides networks into 3 or 4 separate 
bundles and tenders.  Advantages of this option included 
the fact that provision to act as operator of last resort for 
other tenders in the network could be simply included as a 
clause (with appropriate provision for compensation) in each 
tender agreement. Disadvantages included any possible 
sacrifice of economies of scale that could have been 
achieved through a single tender.  Other options include the 
one which I submitted to the Scottish Executive and the 
Scottish Parliament in 2005 and which is discussed in more 
detail in my 2009 Fraser Commentary paper. This option 
provided for the operation of public services including the 
CalMac network by a single state owned body without the 
need for expensive regular retendering and under 
compliance with EC guidelines as reflected in the Altmark 
principles.  
 
As discussed in my 2009 Fraser Commentary paper, the 
Executive rejected my proposal in 2005, advising the 
Scottish Parliament that the Altmark principles were not 
applicable to Scottish ferry services. Three years later in 
2008, the European Commission opened up a State aid 
investigation of Scottish ferry services on the basis that the 
services had to comply with the Altmark principles and there 
were grounds for suspecting that the government had failed 
to ensure this. 
 
Reading these last two sentences together should have 
been sufficient evidence that policy here was not being 
framed in a competent and coherent manner.  However it 
made no visible or discernable difference as to who handled 
policy here or how it was handled.    
 
How can this be changed? The first thing to recognize that 
what is completely missing from the governance of ferry 
services in Scotland is a set of institutional guidelines 
embedded in a statutory rule book similar to other essential 
services. What is needed here is a process by which ways 
for dealing with these problems can be set up.  If the 
problem is defined properly by Parliament as “the provision 
of competitively tendered essential ferry services under EC 
law” this problem could be considered by a small, say 6 
members, Independent Expert Group in which the core 
would be experienced experts from regulated essential 
services (such as energy, postal services, telecoms) with 
input from experts in relevant EC law and ferry services.  
The terms of reference of the Group would be to frame 
institutional and regulatory options for ferry services in 
Scotland.    
 
How to pursue this? The normal procedure and default 
option would be for such a Group to be set up by the 
Scottish Government.  But that brings us back full square to 
where we started with these problems.   There have been 
three full sessions of the Scottish Parliament since 1999, 
there have been Inquiries into the tendering of Scottish ferry 
services in each one of them, and I and others have given 
invited expert evidence to each of these three Inquiries. The 
pattern has been fairly standard so far: evidence given by 
me and others; followed by polite, patient, and informed 
questioning by MSPs on the appropriate Committee; 
followed by representations and/or questions by the 
Committee to the Scottish Executive / Scottish Government; 
followed by explicit or implicit rejection of points for possible 
reform or re-assessment of policy by the Executive/ 
Government; followed by another Inquiry into the tendering 
of Scottish ferry services in the following session of 
parliament about 3 or 4 years later.  
 
Proposals for such an Independent Expert Group have been 
made by me before through a Scottish Parliament Transport 
Committee Convener and suffered the same fate that most 
sensible proposals for reform have suffered once they faced 
neutralizing by advice and intervention of officials.  This is 
understandable and quite rational, it takes a lot to expect 
any institution or group to objectively evaluate and advise on 
proposals that are based on the premise that the group or 
institution in question does not have the commences 
required to adequately perform the tasks with which they 
have been entrusted.     
 
The only real opportunity that such an Independent Expert 
Group would have of being formed with the right skills on 
board and with resources and opportunities to do their job 
properly would be if it was truly independent of official 
interference in its formation and operation.  For that you 
would need a strong Parliament and/or a strong Minister.  I 
must say that my experience over more than a decade has 
led me to advise caution and against over-optimism on 
these counts but there is no choice other than to hope.      
 
____________________ 
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